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INTRODUCTION
What are the legal and substantive contours of U.S. trade agreements? Who
decides? These questions have long occupied commentators and thinkers in
public media and politics. On the eve of a revision of the North American Free
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Trade Agreement (NAFTA)-what I will call the NAFTA 2.0-the U.S.
government is poised for a further showdown between legislative and executive
authorities on these questions as each branch stakes out territory on what the next
U.S. trade agreements should include.
In the last two decades, bilateral and regional trade agreements around the
world have come to constitute a new legal economic framework, filling the gap
where multilateralism failed or became disobliging. The effect of the new
regionalism is a multiplicity of systems, each with its own normative framework
and possible jurisprudence. This multiplicity has led to complicated questions of
interpretation and regime management that engage States and scholars.
For most scholars, however, the story of trade agreements focuses on
substantive outputs: regulatory aspects of the agreements, their broadening
scope, their intersection with other areas of law, or their potential encroachment
on State sovereignty.2 Some political scientists have also analyzed why States
create trade agreements.3 What these agreements do once they have been created,
however, remains under-examined.
While little has been said about how trade agreements are operating in
practice, their design and framing are still less well understood. Neither political
scientists nor legal scholars have focused critically on why States select
particular design features from the rich matrix of available alternatives. The
issues to be addressed include foundational questions about State choices,
institutional constraints, and whether and how trade agreements respond to
uncertainties or changing circumstances that are endemic to the global economy.
Consider the repetition of language across agreements. A close survey of
U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) implemented over the last twenty years
reveals significant similarities in the text of many chapters that they share.
Although there are changes to some parts of the text, those changes are
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Important recent contributions in these categories include Timothy Meyer, Local Liability
in International Economic Law, 95 N.C. L. REv. 261 (2017); Alexia Brunet Marks, The Right to Regulate
(Cooperatively), 38 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2016); Gregory Shaffer, Alternativesfor Regulatory Governance
Under TTIP: Building from the Past, 22 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 403 (2016); Markus Wagner, Regulatory
Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2015); and
Sungjoon Cho, Defragmenting World Trade, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 39 (2006).
3. See, e.g., John Whalley, Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?, in THE
REGIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 63 (Jeffrey A. Frankel ed., 1998).
4. Some political scientists have recently completed important studies that demonstrate the
breadth of the boilerplate problem I describe in this Article. While some of the studies' findings are in
tension, the bottom line remains the same: there is considerable "copy-paste" in these agreements around
the world. See, e.g., Todd Allee, Manfred Elsig & Andrew Lugg, Is the European Union Trade Deal with
Canada New or Recycled? A Text-as-Data Approach, 8 GLOBAL POL'Y 246 (2017); Todd Allee &
Andrew Lugg, Who Wrote the Rules for the Trans-Pacific Partnership?, RES. & POL. (July-Sept. 2016),
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053168016658919; Wolfgang Alschner, Julia Seiermann
& Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Text-as-Data Analysis of Preferential Trade Agreements: Mapping the PTA
Landscape (UNCTAD Research Paper No. 5, 2017), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ser
rp20l7d5_en.pdf; Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, Are the Contents ofInternational Treaties Copied-and-
Pasted? Evidence from Preferential Trade Agreements (World Trade Inst., Working Paper No. 8, 2016).
These studies rely in part on new databases that have collected trade agreement texts for analysis such as
the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) database (www.designoftradeagreements.org) and the RTA
exchange (www.rtaexchange.org).
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overshadowed by the passages that look substantially alike-language I
elsewhere refer to as "boilerplate," as a result of its copy-pasted character.' For
example, compare the text of the labor chapter in the Dominican Republic-
Central America-United States FTA (CAFTA-DR),6 signed in 2005, with the
text of the labor chapter in the U.S.-South Korea FTA of 2012,' or that of the
2016 draft Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP).8 Significant parts of the
countries' commitments are unaltered despite vast differences in those trading
partners' abilities to meet international standards, the passage of time, and
changes in U.S. political leadership.9
The repeated use of standardized text in international agreements is not
unique to trade. So-called "model" agreements are widely used by States in
economic as well as other contexts.10 A "model" agreement may be desirable for
reasons I explore below in greater detail." But are these justifications in fact
motivating negotiators to use repeated language in U.S. trade agreements? And,
more importantly, is that normatively desirable?
This Article's process-tracing history of U.S. trade agreements seeks to
serve an important theoretical purpose-to analyze the under-studied issues of
5. Kathleen Claussen, Boilerplate Treaties (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(exploring the presence of boilerplate in instruments from other areas of international law apart from
trade).
6. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement ch. 16, Aug. 5,
2004, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-
america-fta/final-text [hereinafter CAFTA-DR].
7. Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-U.S., ch. 19, Feb. 10, 2011, https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text (entered into force Mar. 15, 2012) [hereinafter
KORUS].
8. Trans-Pacific Partnership ch. 19, openedfor signature Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text (not yet in force).
9. See infra Section I.A. Scholars and lobbyists have sought changes for those reasons. For
example, Alan Swan described the need for the Free Trade Area of the Americas, a negotiated but never
completed trade agreement. He urged the parties to "go beyond NAFTA" in light of the special
relationship between the United States and Latin America and suggested that the agreement could "be a
charter of fundamental domestic economic reform along . . . modem capitalistic lines" under U.S.
leadership. Alan C. Swan, The Dynamics of Economic Integration in the Western Hemisphere: The
Challenge to America, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2000). Ironically, then President-elect
Trump's pick for Secretary of the Department of Commerce claimed in the days before the inauguration
that the United States needed a model trade agreement, claiming that what was done in the past required
reexamination and that efficiencies were lost. Jenny Leonard, Ross Pledges to Design "Model Trade
Agreement, " Calls for Systematic Re-Examination ofDeals, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Jan. 18, 2017). The U.S.
Trade Representative later made reference to creating a "model" U.S. trade agreement for Africa. Dan
Dupont, Lighthizer: US. Will Soon Select an African Country for a "Model" Free Trade Deal, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE (Jan. 31, 2018).
10. Models are used and regularly updated in the U.S. experience with bilateral investment
treaties and with income tax conventions. See Bilateral Investment Treaties and RelatedAgreements, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2018); Treasury Announces
Release of 2016 U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY (Feb. 17, 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/j10356.aspx (l t visited Mar. 18, 2018). In
trade, however, there is no such named "model" and no regular attempt to update and reissue any particular
template. Rather, there is a perception among some lawmakers that there is considerable variation and
opportunities for change in trade agreements when, as this study shows, the data suggest hat there is in
fact considerable path dependence.
11. The object of this study is not an exhaustive consideration of alternative reasons for using a
model, but rather an attempt to provide a particular hypothesis with respect to trade agreements in the
context of the inadequate explanatory power of certain prominent schools of thought in international
relations.
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trade agreement design, innovation, and change. In doing so, the Article
considers whether explanations consistent with leading international relations
and international law models-such as rational choice theory, behavioral
economics, and historical institutionalism-help explain trade agreement
consistency.1 2 Each theory predicts a particular life cycle for trade agreements
and none is entirely exclusive of the others. A comparative review of U.S. trade
agreements provides an opportunity to evaluate these competing theoretical
frameworks and to consider the role of government actors in promoting
normative change. However, the Article concludes that the traditional
explanatory models are insufficient to explain the mechanics of U.S. trade
agreement design, innovation, and change. The chronicle of trade agreement
evolution, or lack thereof, suggests that when shifts in direction do occur, they
do not cleanly follow the predictions of any one theoretical paradigm due to the
unique congressional-executive shared process for U.S. trade lawmaking.
The bi-branch trade lawmaking architecture is the exceptional result of our
constitutional history and trends in the global economy. The process, sewn into
a patchwork of time-bound legislation, is known as "fast track" or trade
promotion authority (TPA). Today, TPA is the nearly exclusive mechanism for
making major U.S. trade agreements.13 It has not always been this way. Only
after Article II trade treaties went out of vogue1 4 has the TPA framework become
the modus operandi for the conclusion of trade agreements with foreign partners.
As this analysis reveals, that framework is more constricted today than it ever
was intended to be. Since it was first applied in 1974, subsequent TPA legislation
has nearly consistently allocated more power to Congress and less space to the
Executive.
This development contrasts sharply with the conventional wisdom on
trends in executive authority in other areas of international lawmaking." Unlike
other areas of international law, the shift in authority between the branches in
trade has tended toward escalated congressional involvement rather than
executive dominance.16 Congress has increased its engagement hrough changes
in the structural and substantive elements of the TPA legislation it has enacted
over the last forty years.
12. As noted above, my purpose is not intended to compare and contrast all schools of thought
on this subject. Rather, I select schools that academics and practitioners have readily considered in seeking
to explain the consistency of U.S. trade agreements and mention others only in passing. See, e.g., Jean
Galbraith, Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral Understanding of Treaty Design, 53 VA. J. INT'L L.
309, 344-55 (2013) (discussing literature from several schools); William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory
and International Legal Scholarship, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227, 229, 234-35 (1997) (also
discussing trends in the literature).
13. All but one of the major trade compacts concluded by the United States in the twenty-first
century have taken shape through the TPA process.
14. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
16. This trade trend was previewed by Harold Koh as early as the late 1980s. Koh outlines five
"regimes" of congressional-executive interaction on international trade relations, beginning with the
earliest stage when Congress maintained full control over trade lawmaking and proceeding through the
1980s to a point where Congress "surrendered" some of its control and conceded the President's need for
advance negotiating authority. Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade
Policymaking after INS v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1191, 1233 (1986).
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Despite the utility in negotiations and democratic significance of a strong
ex ante congressional control on executive negotiators, these increased
constraints have serious drawbacks when taken to an extreme. Congress's
tightened grip on the Executive in the trade context has resulted in Congress
effectively displacing the Executive as the lead negotiating branch with foreign
trading partners. Unfortunately, negotiating major trade agreements is not
Congress's forte. Congress is not adept at accommodating change to existing
frameworks,17 as the content of our trade agreements bears out. Thus, a key
takeaway of this study is that the text of U.S. trade agreements is better explained
by the separation of powers structure-and the institutional design that has been
developed to accommodate that structure-than by other theories.
The evidence from this study further suggests that not only does the
constitutional and institutional structure of trade lawmaking in the United States
account for the considerable consistency in the resulting agreements, but it also
illuminates a potential principal-agent relationship between Congress and the
Executive that merits further study. I propose that a more useful account of the
trade agreement design process relies upon a blend of traditional theories and an
acknowledgement of this structural relationship.
This Article does not seek to analyze every aspect of change in U.S. trade
agreements. Rather, I limit my discussion to chapters that best exemplify trends.
I analyze how TPA's founders envisioned that trade lawmaking would occur,
how the exercise evolved in response to exogenous pressures, and how that is
exemplified by the lack of change in agreement ext. What emerges is a tapestry
of change factors, many of which relate back to the congressional role. Unlike
the traditional trade disciplines where consistency is expected, chapters that seek
to address non-tariff barriers such as those focused on labor and environment are
largely locked into the congressional negotiating guidance.
The trade lawmaking account explored in this Article poses new theoretical
challenges for scholars who study how and why domestic institutions have an
impact on international law. These challenges include determining the factors
that define the strategic spaces for international legal development and
specifying the conditions under which Congress and the Executive can re-
balance their authorities. Trade agreements are particularly noteworthy in that
they are both lawmaking and standard-setting. They create new international
norms through the proliferation of standards in bilateral and regional
instruments. Thus, a major contribution of this Article is that it identifies
opportunities for legal creativity and legal coherence in the international trade
lawmaking process.
An examination of the congressional-executive relationship in trade
lawmaking is important for three additional reasons. First, as described above,
this study fills a gap in that it evaluates trends in U.S. trade agreements by
concentrating on the institutional dynamics on the U.S. drafters' side. The
17. See, e.g., Kristina Daugirdas, Congress Underestimated: The Case of the World Bank, 107
AM. J. INT'L L. 517, 550 (2013) (describing how Congress faces barriers to monitoring and has a "limited
toolkit").
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international and domestic law implications are both alarming and encouraging.
Trade lawmaking through TPA arguably increases the democratic nature of the
process, but it also creates a risk of interest group capture and, as this study
emphasizes, stagnation of text.18 The evidence demonstrates that one result of
TPA in its current form is the presence of lowest-common-denominator language
in current and past trade agreements that may work to the detriment of U.S.
interests.
Second, President Donald Trump's Administration has undertaken a
critical re-evaluation of trade agreements. The evolution of trade law has
important implications for public policy choices, for the international trade law
multilateral system, and for the global economy. This piece seeks to provide
scholarly analysis that is of practical use to negotiators and lawmakers.
Third, lessons about the trade lawmaking apparatus provide guidance for
governance design in other areas where power is shared between Congress and
the Executive. As additional areas of transnational law develop in which the
division of authority between the branches is contested, lessons to be learned
from the trade lawmaking experience should inform how developments of
substance in those areas advance particular processes or structural mechanisms,
and how those processes or structures in turn affect substantive developments in
the law.
This Article proceeds in four parts. First, I describe the present generation
of trade agreements, its evolution, and the emergence of default standard text.
The Article selects as a case study the chapters with a high degree of consistency.
Second, I analyze the constitutional and historical forces at work in shaping trade
agreement text and the existing theories that may explain the standardization
trend. Third, the Article argues that none of the dominant international relations
theories for managing change accounts well for the effects on trade law practice.
In applying each theoretical approach, I conclude that the carefully structured
choreography between Congress and the Executive is the strongest determining
factor for consistency in U.S. trade agreements. Put differently, the frozen text is
an unanticipated byproduct of the institutional architecture. Finally, I propose a
rethinking of the congressional-executive ntangled tango. Given all that is at
stake, review and revision are urgently needed. I set out some preliminary
thoughts that seek to take proper account of the international trade regime and
that maximize the benefits of both consistency and innovation.
I. THE NAFTA 1.0 & ITS PROGENY
Upon beginning negotiations in August 2017, the Trump Administration
announced that negotiations toward the NAFTA 2.0 would be complete by the
end of that year. In seeking to make that deadline, the Office of the U.S. Trade
18. Surprisingly, "perhaps the greatest irony of fast track [TPA] is that it has come under attack
as being undemocratic and for undermining public accountability when it was actually designed to dojust
the opposite." See Hal Shapiro & Lael Brainard, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as Fast
Track: Building Common Ground on Trade Demands More Than a Name Change, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L
L. REV. 1, 4 (2003).
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Representative (USTR) issued "negotiating objectives" for the revised
agreement in July 2017. Those negotiating objectives largely resembled the
objectives that governed the negotiations with Canada, Mexico, and nine other
trading partners of the United States in the TPP, leading commentators to
question whether the NAFTA 2.0 would be a repeat of the TPP.19
In stark contrast o the fast-paced NAFTA 2.0 negotiations, the conclusion
of the TPP in October 2015 marked the end of a six-year negotiating exercise in
a region that represents nearly forty percent of the global gross domestic product.
However, just over one year later, the TPP-once the centerpiece of the Obama
Administration's regional trade agenda-was dead, at least for the United States.
The Trump Administration declared opposition to the draft text, "unsigning" it
within a few days of taking office.2 0 Even before the 2016 U.S. presidential
election, controversy swirled as to whether congressional approval would be
feasible in the seemingly negative trade space of today's politics.21 That the
implementation of a negotiated U.S. trade agreement could be in doubt after so
many years and so many resources is a failure of the fragile two-branch trade
lawmaking apparatus.
The roots of the TPP stretch to the earliest U.S. free trade agreements.2 2
The shared language across agreements has led me to refer to them as a single
"generation" of agreements.23 The language has global influence. Political
scientists Manfred Elsig and Todd Allee have used text-as-data nalysis to
confirm the widespread proliferation of U.S. trade agreement language in trade
19. See, e.g., Simon Lester, The Trump Administration's NAFTA Negotiating Objectives, INT'L
ECON. L. & POL'Y BLOG (July 17, 2017), http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2017/07/the-trump-
administrations-nafta-negotiating-objectives.html. USTR updated the negotiating objectives in November
2017, making very few changes. See USTR Releases Updated NAFTA Negotiating Objectives, OFF. U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Nov. 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2017/november/ustr-releases-updated-nafta#.
20. Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama's Signature Trade Deal,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-trade-
nafta.html. Discussing the congressional-executive relationship at the start of the Trump Administration,
one journalist described how "some sources have wondered how the power triangle will play out in the
new administration." Leonard, supra note 9.
21. Both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump took positions opposing the TPP. Jacob Pramuk,
Clinton and Trump Can Agree on At Least One Thing, CNBC (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/
2016/08/11/trump-and-clinton-now-sound-similar-on-one-key-issue.html. The antagonism toward the
agreement was also pervasive in Congress. Speaking of the TPP in the Senate in 2015, Bernie Sanders
said: "The truth is that we have seen this movie time and time and time again. Let me tell my colleagues
that the ending of this movie is not very good. It is a pretty bad ending." 161 CONG. REC. S2374 (daily
ed. Apr. 23, 2015).
22. The precursor to the TPP, the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, was initiated
in 2003 by Singapore, New Zealand, and Chile. The United States joined the negotiations in 2008.
Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Expanding the P-4 Trade Agreement into a Broader Trans-Pacific Partnership:
Implications, Risks, and Opportunities, 4 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 401, 404-05 (2009).
Kolsky Lewis draws connections with an earlier Asia-Pacific agreement but notes the U.S. position that
the TPP would be negotiated on U.S. terms, not building off the Asia-Pacific agreement as a base.
Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?, 34
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 27, 28-38 (2011) [hereinafter Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific Partnership].
23. 1 have used this term in recent work. Kathleen Claussen, Trading Spaces: The Changing
Role ofthe Executive in US. Trade Lawmaking, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 345 (2017) [hereinafter
Claussen, Trading Spaces]; Kathleen Claussen, The Next Generation of U.S.-Africa Trade Instruments,
111 AJIL UNBOUND 384 (2017).
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agreements around the world.24 All but one of these agreements were negotiated
under the auspices of the joint congressional-executive process known as "fast
track" or TPA.
The first bilateral trade agreement egotiated under TPA was the U.S.-
Israel FTA (1985).25 Between 1985 and 2000, only two additional agreements
would be negotiated: the U.S.-Canada FTA (1988)26 and the NAFTA (1993).27
From 2001 through 2007, the United States concluded eight free trade
agreements: U.S.-Singapore (2003),28 U.S.-Chile (2003),29 U.S.-Australia
(2004)30 U.S.-Morocco (2004),31 CAFTA-DR (2005),32 U.S.-Bahrain
(2006),33 U.S.-Oman (2006),34 and U.S.-Peru (2007).35 Only the U.S.-Jordan
FTA of 2001,36 negotiated by the Clinton Administration but implemented by
24. For example, these political scientists observe that the United States is not alone in copying
and pasting from other agreements. See Allee, Elsig & Lugg, supra note 4, at 249 (describing how the
trade agreement between the European Union and Canada reflects twenty-three percent text previously
used by Canada and eighteen percent text previously used by the EU); see also Allee & Elsig, supra note
4, at 16-20 (tracing similarities across pairs of preferential trade agreements around the world).
Furthermore, there are increasingly shared principles and policies found in agreements around the world.
See Kathleen Claussen, Stocktaking and Glimpsing at Trade Law's Next Generation, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ANNUAL MEETING 92, 94 (2017) (describing a
"normative cascade" among regional trade agreements). Further, others have shown how considerable
baseline text for FTAs around the world comes from the WTO Agreements. See Todd Allee, Manfred
Elsig & Andrew Lugg, The Ties between the World Trade Organization and Preferential Trade
Agreements: A Textual Analysis, 20 J. INT'L ECON. L. 333 (2017); Henrik Horn, Petros Mavroidis &
Andr6 Sapir, Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy ofEU and US Preferential Trade Agreements, 2010 WORLD
ECON. 1565.
25. Israel-United States: Free Trade Agreement, Isr.-U.S., Apr. 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M 653. 1 use
"FTA" for all agreements to avoid confusion even though some agreements use the title "Trade Promotion
Agreement" which would also go by the initials TPA.
26. Canada-United States: Free Trade Agreement, Can.-U.S., Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281.
27. NAFTA, supra note 1.
28. United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Sing.-U.S., May 6, 2003, H. Doc. 108-100,
at 5, 2003 U.S.T. LEXIS 254 [hereinafter U.S.-Sing. FTA].
29. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, H. Doc. 108-101, at
5, 42 I.L.M. 1026 (2003), 2004 U.S.T. LEXIS 242 [hereinafter U.S.-Chile FTA].
30. United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., May 18, 2004,43 I.L.M. 1248
(2004) [hereinafter U.S.-Austl. FTA]. The final text is available at OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/ftalaustralia/assetupload-filel48_5168.pdf (last
visited Mar. 18, 2018).
31. United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, Morocco-U.S., June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M.
544 (2005) [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco FTA]. The final text is available at Final Text, OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-fta/final-text (last
visited Mar. 18, 2018).
32. CAFTA-DR, supra note 6.
33. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Govemment
of the Kingdom of Bahrain on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Bahr.-U.S., Sep. 14, 2004, 44
I.L.M. 544 (2005) [hereinafter U.S.-Bahr. FTA]. The final text is available at Final Text, OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/bahrain-fta/final-text (last
visited Mar. 18, 2018).
34. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Govemment
of the Sultanate of Oman on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oman-U.S., Jan. 19, 2006, 2006
U.S.T. LEXIS 119 [hereinafter U.S.-Oman FTA]. The final text is also available at Final Text, OFF. U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/oman-fta/final-text
(last visited Mar. 18, 2018).
35. Trade Promotion Agreement, Peru-U.S., Apr. 12, 2006, 2006 U.S.T. LEXIS 131. The final
text is also available at Final Text, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/
free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text (last visited Mar. 18, 2018).
36. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
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the George W. Bush Administration, was negotiated and implemented without
going through the TPA process. As shown below, the Jordan agreement is
exceptional in its level of innovation when compared to the TPA-supported
agreements. In 2011, Congress implemented the U.S.-Panama37  U.S.-
Colombia,38 and U.S.-South Korea3 9 agreements under TPA.40
Apart from the growth in the number of topics covered by trade agreements
and some new chapters to accommodate those new topics,4 1 the text of several
of the chapters matches the text of earlier agreements. The language has simply
been copied from one agreement o the next like boilerplate.42
In my review, I divide the chapters of U.S. agreements into two groups: (1)
chapters repeated from one agreement to the next with high consistency of
language and very few changes and (2) repeated chapters with a moderate level
of consistency along with a slightly greater number of changes. A third group,
chapters that are new to trade agreements, makes up a small category, which is
in itself telling. Even some of these supposedly new chapters draw from old
agreements, however.4 3 I concentrate on the first group to understand why those
chapters have not changed. Within that group, I select the labor and environment
chapters for this study. As this analysis confirms, determining the factors that
contribute to innovation and change is not a binary or simple issue. The pathway
from innovation to standardization is multilayered.
A. High Consistency and Thin Innovation
Labor and environment commitments did not appear in trade agreements
until backlash to the NAFTA prompted the Clinton Administration to negotiate
two side agreements related to those topics.44 The resulting North American
on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 (2002), 2000 U.S.T.
LEXIS 160 (entered into force Dec. 17, 2001) [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan FTA].
37. Trade Promotion Agreement, Pan.-U.S., June 28, 2007, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/
free-trade-agreements/panama-tpa/final-text (entered into force Oct. 31, 2012) [hereinafter U.S.-Pan.
FTA].
38. Trade Promotion Agreement, Colom.-U.S., Nov. 22, 2006, https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-text ( ntered into force May 15, 2012) [hereinafter
U.S.-Colom. FTA].
39. KORUS, supra note 7.
40. Both houses approved the implementing legislation for the three agreements on October 12,
2011. See 157 CONG. REc. 15292-96, 15373-74 (2011). However, the negotiations for these three
agreements were begun and signed within the timeframe set out by the 2002 TPA, which expired on July
1,2007.
41. See, e.g., Simon Lester, The Role of the International Trade Regime in Global Governance,
16 UCLA J.INT'L L. & FOREIGNAFF. 209, 211, 221-38. (2011) (providing an overview ofthe expansion
of trade agreements).
42. In other forthcoming work, I describe lessons to be learned from contract for international
agreements in respect of boilerplate language not just in international economic law but also in other areas
of international law. See Claussen, supra note 5.
43. The TPP chapter on State-owned enterprises, for example, was not proposed from whole
cloth; rather, it built on language from the U.S.-Singapore FTA-the last agreement with a party which,
like some of the other TPP parties, has a significant presence of State-owned enterprises. See U.S.-Sing.
FTA, supra note 28, ch. 12. The TPP was an elaboration of that initial text.
44. For a helpful overview of the factors leading to the negotiations of the side agreements, see
Steve Charnovitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for Environmental
Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treatymaking, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 257 (1994).
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Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) and the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) included provisions with
limited enforceability.4 5 For instance, the NAALC includes objectives to
improve working conditions and living standards, to encourage cooperation, and
to promote compliance and enforcement.4 6 Canada, Mexico, and the United
States agree in this side text to enforce their respective labor laws and standards;
however, the only matter subject to dispute settlement procedures i a "matter
where the alleged persistent pattern of failure by the Party complained against to
effectively enforce its occupational safety and health, child labor or minimum
wage technical standards is trade-related; and covered by mutually recognized
labor laws."47 Even then, the enforcement mechanism differs from the
commercial enforcement for the NAFTA; it places a cap on any monetary
enforcement assessment, for example.48 Still, the NAALC and the NAAEC side
agreements were the first in which labor standards and environmental
commitments related to trade were contemplated.
It was the U.S.-Jordan FTA that came closer to realizing the objectives of
the labor and environment communities by incorporating the NAALC and
NAAEC principles and more into the trade agreement itself. With respect to
labor, the Jordan FTA included an article according to which each party is
obligated to "not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws, through a sustained or
recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the
Parties, after the date of entry into force of this Agreement."4 9 This provision
grew out of the similar language appearing in the NAALC, but the U.S.-Jordan
FTA makes that provision enforceable under the same dispute resolution
procedures as the commercial provisions.50 The enforceability element, and in
particular its appearance in the agreement ext rather than as a side agreement,
was the most important innovation of the U.S.-Jordan FTA, allowing either party
to bring concerns about compliance with the labor article to a panel for
adjudication. This innovation stands out in the history of the labor and
environment trade negotiations. Its exceptionality in innovation correlates with
its exceptionality: it was not subject to the TPA framework.
Each of the labor chapters in the trade agreements negotiated between 2002
and 200751 uses the same text as appeared in the U.S.-Jordan FTA, both the
45. The side agreements were lumped into the implementing bill for the NAFTA. See North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 107 Stat. 2129, 19 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq.
46. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation arts. 1-6, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499
(1993) [hereinafter NAALC].
47. Id. art. 29. The same language covered environmental obligations in the NAAEC. North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation art. 22, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993).
48. Chamovitz, supra note 4444, at 269.
49. This paragraph appears in Article 6.4(a) of the U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 36. I will focus
on labor for efficiency, but the same patterns occur in the area of environmental obligations.
50. Article 3 of the NAALC provides: "Each Party shall promote compliance with and
effectively enforce its labor law through appropriate government action ..... NAALC, supra note 46,
art. 3; see also Marc Lacey, Bush Seeking to Modify Pact on Trade with Jordan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/l1/world/11PREX.html ("It is the first American trade initiative
that included labor and environmental standards as part of the main text, putting the rights of workers and
the duty of companies not o pollute on the same plane with tariffs.").
51. See U.S.-Austl. FTA, supra note 30, ch. 18; U.S.-Bahr. FTA, supra note 33, ch. 15; U.S.-
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paragraph noted above and a subsequent paragraph,52 and also defines key terms
the same way. Each defines "labor laws" as "a Party's statutes or regulations . .
. that are directly related to" a list of internationally recognized worker rights.
The three subsequent FTAs and the TPP also use the same language for the
principal enforceable provisions of the chapter.
Thus, the precise words and phrases used for the major obligations of the
labor chapters across the generation after the U.S.-Jordan FTA are consistent.
Substantively, the same is also true. Few new articles have been added and few
commitments have been changed. The same type of repetition and lack of
innovation occurs in the environment chapter with respect to both text and
substance.54 A second exceptional moment occurred in 2007 when the United
States began negotiating labor and environmental chapters in which nearly all
State commitments were enforceable. Agreements implemented or negotiated
after 2007 feature this notable difference. The change in U.S. policy resulted
from a major bipartisan deal concluded on May 10, 2007. The deal, referred to
colloquially by practitioners as the "May 10 agreement" or the "May 10
language," achieved a shift in U.S. objectives in favor of stronger language in
certain chapters: labor, environment, intellectual property, investment,
government procurement, and services.5
Chile FTA, supra note 29, ch. 18; U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note 31, ch. 16; U.S.-Oman FTA, supra
note 34, ch. 16; U.S.-Sing. FTA, supra note 28, ch. 17. These agreements contain some provisions that
do not appear in the legislative text and thus were either adopted based on agreements that preceded them
or resulted from executive and foreign partner elaboration and innovation. However, most of these
provisions relate to cooperation and consultation and none imposes enforceable obligations on the parties.
52. The subsequent paragraph provides the parties with discretion in enforcement: "[E]ach Party
retains the right to exercise discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and
compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with
respect to other labor matters determined to have higher priorities. Accordingly, the Parties understand
that a Party is in compliance with subparagraph (a) where a course of action or inaction reflects a
reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide decision regarding the allocation of
resources." U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 36, art. 6.4(b).
53. See KORUS, supra note 7, art. 19.8; U.S.-Colom. FTA, supra note 38, art. 17.8; U.S.-Pan.
FTA, supra note 37, art. 16.9; Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 8, art. 19.1.
54. For instance, the language in the environment chapter in the CAFTA-DR signed in 2005 is
very similar to the environment chapter in the KORUS implemented in 2012. (The KORUS was largely
negotiated several years earlier, but critical changes were made toward the end of the process to enable
ratification.) Both chapters require that the parties not "fail to effectively enforce its environmental laws
[KORUS adds: "and its laws, regulations, and other measures to fulfill its obligations under the covered
agreements [set out in an Annex]"] through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a
manner affecting trade [KORUS adds: or investment] between the Parties, after the date [CAFTA-DR: of
entry into force of this Agreement][KORUS: this Agreement enters into force]." KORUS, supra note 7,
art. 20.3; CAFTA-DR, supra note 6, art. 17.2. In another example, "Each Party shall ensure that judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative proceedings . .. are available. .. [CAFTA-DR: "to sanction or remedy";
KORUS: "to provide sanctions or remedies for"] violations of its environmental laws." KORUS, supra
note 7, art. 20.4.2; CAFTA-DR, supra note 6, art. 17.3. In both examples, the obligations and specific
language are nearly identical. Even in those articles where the obligation is substantively altered, the
wording is very similar. For example, the parties agree in CAFTA-DR that each party "shall strive to
ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from,
such laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protections afforded in those laws," whereas in
KORUS, the obligation is strengthened according to the May 10 deal, such that the parties commit that
"neither party shall waive or otherwise derogate from or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such
laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protections afforded in those laws." KORUS, supra note 7,
art. 20.3.2 (emphasis added); CAFTA-DR, supra note 6, art. 17.2.2 (emphasis added).
55. See Charles B. Rangel, Moving Forward. A New Bipartisan Trade Policy that Reflects
American Values, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 377 (2008).
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Other than including the May 10 agreement changes, no new or altered
provisions of considerable note were negotiated in the TPP labor or environment
chapters.5 6 One small addition to the labor chapter was made covering parties'
commitment to adopt and maintain laws on acceptable conditions of work. The
practical effect of this provision was relatively limited, however, given that all
of the partner countries already had such laws on the books.
This repetition stands in contrast to the positions of labor and
environmental advocates. During the TPP negotiations, the labor community
sought changes to the language of past agreements, few of which were
incorporated into the resulting draft agreement. Those include some that would
not have posed major logistical or legal challenges for the United States to adopt:
the addition of a provision to set up a labor secretariat; the addition of enforceable
provisions related to child labor; the addition of an enforceable provision on
forced labor; and changes to the language to reduce "excessive discretion or
delay" regarding government consideration of complaints.5 9 The lack of change
across the agreements in response to these demands fuels the fire of FTA critics
and likely contributed to the public rhetoric impeding the TPP's implementation
in the United States in 2016.60
The labor and environmental advocacy communities were not alone in
confronting the repeated language in the labor and environment chapters. In the
first case brought under an FTA labor chapter, the United States faced opposition
from Guatemala, the other disputing party in the case, in advocating that
Guatemala's failure to enforce its labor laws occurred in a "manner affecting
trade between the Parties" and was carried out through a "sustained or recurring
course of action" as required by the applicable agreement, the CAFTA-DR.61
56. According to one study, "with no less than 136 different environmental norms [in the TPP],
only two of these were really new .... The other 134 were copied from preexisting trade agreements."
Jean Fr~dric Morin, Joost Pauwelyn & James Holloway, The Trade Regime as a Complex Adaptive
System: Exploration and Exploitation ofEnvironmental Norms in Trade Agreements, 20 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 365, 383 (2017).
57. A second new provision to "discourage" the importation of products made with forced labor
was also added as was a third to facilitate conversation among parties regarding labor issues of interest.
58. According to the AFL-CIO: "While the TPP includes some trivial changes to the Labor
Chapter from the 'May 10' standard, none of the changes provide significant new protections for workers,
nor do they remedy the completely discretionary nature of labor enforcement." AFL-CIO, REPORT ON




60. Such a narrow focus, however, misses that negotiators make advances beyond the surface
of the agreement. For example, the dialogues created with governments as to threshold standards that must
be met as a condition to entry into force do not always reach the public eye. Nevertheless, the empirical
point remains: there is very little difference in chapter text.
61. See generally the written submissions of the United States and Guatemala, available at In
the Matter of Guatemala-Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR,
OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/labor/bilateral-and-regional-trade-
agreements/guatemala-submission-under-cafta-dr (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). The Panel concluded that
the United States did not successfully prove that Guatemala's failures to effectively enforce its labor laws
occurred "in a manner affecting trade." Final Panel Report, In the Matter of Guatemala-Issues Relating
to the Obligations Under Article 162.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR, ¶¶ 503-07 (June 14, 2017),
https://www.trade.gov/industry/tas/Guatemala%20%20%E2%80%93%200bligations%20Under%20Art
icle%2016-2-1(a)%200f/o20the%2OCAFTA-DR%20%20June%2014%202017.pdf [hereinafter Final
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These same phrases appear in nearly all U.S. agreements. The AFL-CIO had
maintained that this language posed "an unnecessary hurdle" for the United
States.62 Ultimately, the United States was unsuccessful in demonstrating that
Guatemala had breached the CAFTA-DR on the basis of the Panel's
interpretation of that particular language.6 3 Despite this outcome, early
indications suggest that the Trump Administration seeks to use the same
language again in the NAFTA 2.0.64
In some respects, the similarities in labor and environment chapters across
agreements should not be surprising. Many of the standards they share represent
basic standards to which the United States-both the Executive and the
legislature-would likely want all trading partners to agree: enforce labor and
environmental laws, do not waive or derogate from those laws, and encourage
mechanisms to monitor performance. These may be foundational commitments
that should be maintained. The question that persists is whether these are the best
or only provisions to fill that space.
B. Moderate Consistency and Moderate Innovation
As compared to the chapters of high consistency such as the labor and
environment chapters, other FTA chapters exhibit considerable consistency but
permit certain selective innovations. For example, the intellectual property (IP)
chapters over time also include a number of similarities that together comprise a
basic template. The IP chapter in the TPP was exceedingly similar to past IP
chapters, although beyond the standard chapter text it included four country-
specific annexes, two annexes related to Internet service providers, and thirteen
separate side letters.
Generally, the IP chapters in agreements dating from 2002 onward are all
similar with the exception of the changes made to those chapters post-May 10,
2007. The agreements subject to the May 10 changes have less stringent
requirements on patent term extensions, patent linkages, and data exclusivity
than those that came before that deal was struck.65 Unlike in labor and
environment, where the TPP chapters incorporated the May 10 language, critics
of the TPP claim that its IP chapter abandoned the gains of the May 10 deal in
those three areas.6 6 For example, under the May 10 language, parties may choose
whether to provide for patent term extensions in their domestic laws. The TPP,
by contrast, would have required countries to provide for patent extensions for
regulatory review periods or patent prosecution periods deemed
"unreasonable."67
Panel Report, In the Matter of Guatemala].
62. See AFL-CIO, supra note 59, at 16.
63. Final Panel Report, In the Matter of Guatemala, supra note 61.
64. Jenny Leonard & Jack Caporal, Despite Democrats'Hope, USTR Has Not Indicated It Will
Push for NAFTA Labor Standards That Go Beyond TPP, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Jan. 29, 2018).
65. SHAYERAH ILIAS & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34292, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2011).
66. See, e.g., Initial Analyses of Key TPP Chapters, PUB. CITIZEN (Nov. 2015),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/analysis-tpp-text-november-2015.pdf.
67. In another area, biologics, where there was heavy lobbying and debate, critics maintain that
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Looking at fourteen different provisions in the TPP IP chapter, twelve of
them have substantively equivalent language in at least one prior U.S. FTA.68
The other two, both provisions on patent scope, introduce two new or newly
combined elements. The small changes that were made to the chapter text were
said to make the chapter consistent with U.S. IP law.69
Like the IP chapter, the TPP dispute settlement chapter largely resembled
past dispute settlement chapters, though it accommodated at least one new
provision with substantive import that would have provided guidance to
arbitrators regarding how to interpret the agreement in light of WTO case law.70
These chapters may again be lightly updated for the NAFTA 2.0 consistent with
the TPP draft. Most notable from the early NAFTA 2.0 negotiations is the
common exchange between the executive and legislative branches in the U.S.
government regarding the Trump Administration's lack of transparency,
according to members of both political parties in Congress.72
C. Situating the Variable Landscape
As shown above, there are clear trends of consistency across several trade
agreement chapters. Not discussed above are traditional trade chapters such as
those that set out obligations of non-discrimination and most-favored-nation
treatment and those that refer to the creation of a free trade area. These chapters
are likewise consistent but are premised largely on internationally recognized
terms of art or legal and economic concepts that do not lend themselves as easily
to innovation by their very nature. By contrast, in the "trade-plus" chapters such
as those covering labor, environment, and intellectual property, one would
expect to see greater variation based on differences in the States participating,
changes in political leadership, or the passage of time.
Having shown that large parts of U.S. trade agreements are characterized
by moderate to high consistency, the puzzle that remains is how to explain why
this phenomenon occurs in U.S. trade agreements. The landscape of variation in
the Obama Administration did not push back against foreign counterparts. Id. at 9. The American
University Washington College of Law also analyzed the TPP IP chapter in comparison with the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and noted some similarities, but most of those similarities are not at the
textual level as is the case among past FTAs. See Carrie Ellen Sager, TPP vs. ACTA: Line by Line,
INFOJUSTICE (Mar. 27, 2012), http://infojustice.org/archives/9256.
68. For an interesting chart illustrating this point, see TPP Key Provision Comparison with
FTAs, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TPPKeyProvision_
Comparison with FTAs.pdf (last visited May 16, 2018). See also Gina M. Vetere et al., What's New in
the TPP's Intellectual Property Chapter, GLOBAL POL'Y WATCH (Nov. 24, 2015),
http://www.globalpolicywatch.com/2015/1 /whats-new-in-the-tpps-intellectual-property-chapter.
69. See Vetere et al., supra note 68 (describing the changes and how the TPP IP chapter is
"broadly consistent" with the IP chapters of prior U.S. trade agreements).
70. Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 8, art. 28.12.3.
71. See USTR Releases NAFTA Negotiating Objectives, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
(July 2017), http://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/july/ustr-releases-
nafta-negotiating. In late 2017, however, rumors emerged that the Trump Administration sought to
propose non-binding dispute settlement, though the final outcome of those conversations is yet unknown.
U.S. Proposes Non-Binding State-to-State Dispute Settlement in NAFTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Oct. 15,
2017).
72. See, e.g., Dan Dupont, Ways & Means Democrats Demand Hearings on NAFTA's
Renegotiation, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Feb. 22, 2018).
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the level of consistency of U.S. trade agreements has not been addressed in legal
scholarship. Some political scientists have identified the copy-paste ffect in the
agreements,73 but few have sought to explain why the use of boilerplate language
is so prevalent. If anything, the trend and the cause are misunderstood by
practitioners.7 4
I maintain that the landscape of varied consistency is best explained by a
structural separation of powers theory as discussed in the remainder of this
Article. Other dominant international relations and international law theories do
not seize upon the way in which the unique structural and institutional elements
surrounding trade agreement negotiations create constraints for lawmakers. To
be sure, the construction of trade agreement text is undoubtedly a complex
phenomenon, but unlike most treaties or contracts into which the State enters,
trade agreements are specially constrained by the separation of powers of the
U.S. Constitution with respect to foreign commerce. I first situate the consistency
observations in this separation of powers theory before turning to alternative
explanations. Each of these alternative theories offers plausible accounts for
State behavior in the negotiation of trade agreements, but a separation of powers
explanation, or what I call a "structural institutionalist" theory, does a better job
than others with which it is in conversation. Thus, in the next Part, I describe the
architecture of U.S. trade lawmaking and underscore its alignment with the
consistency issues outlined above.
II. THE SEPARATION OF TRADE LAW POWERS
The structure through which Congress and the Executive engage to devise
the content of our trade agreements has emerged out of a shift from Article If
treaty-making to Article I legislative implementation of "congressional-
executive agreements"-extra-constitutional instruments employed in trade and
other areas-to accommodate the rise of the twentieth-century multilateral
economic regime. Understanding the tension between Congress and the
Executive in this space, as well as the current process through which they engage
on trade, requires a short recounting of that evolution. I highlight here critical
points in the trade story, which begins at the nation's founding.
A. Revisiting Constitutional Blueprints
In the earliest days of U.S. trade lawmaking, Congress regularly issued
tariff schedules pursuant to its power under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution to lay and collect duties and to "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations."7 Thereafter, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaties
negotiated by the Executive with the advice and consent of the Senate dominated
U.S. foreign commercial engagement.7 6 As the FCN treaties came to outlive their
73. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 9.
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
76. John Coyle provides an overview of the literature on and history of FCN treaties. See John
F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation in the Modern Era, 51 COLUM. J.
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utility, a constitutional question arose: if the regulation of foreign commerce is
primarily for Congress, and treaties are primarily for the Executive, how would
the government organize its position regarding a treaty concerning foreign
commerce?7 7 This blurry area of shared power assigned in one respect to
Congress and in another to the Executive contributed to doubts about whether
the treaty or some other device could serve U.S. interests.78
The treaty power as described in Article II of the Constitution has always
been one of the most important, and most controversial, federal powers.7 9 As a
general matter, the treaty was never the exclusive domain of the Executive. In
The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton commented that the treaty power
formed "a distinct department" belonging "properly, neither to the legislative nor
to the executive."80 Writing of the congressional-executive realms of authority,
Hamilton noted: "The power of making treaties is, plainly, neither the' one nor
the other. It relates neither to the execution of the subsisting laws nor to the
enaction of new ones; and still less to an exertion of the common strength. Its
objects are contracts with foreign nations . . . .",' Likewise, the Treaty Clause
does not differentiate among treaty subjects. It does not carve out areas of foreign
relations enumerated to other areas of the government, such as foreign
TRANSNAT'L L. 302 (2013). Practice has influenced the meaning of "advice and consent." Presidential
consultation of the Senate for advice prior to submitting a treaty for consent has been an exceedingly rare
practice. As Louis Henkin has noted, "' [A]dvice and consent' has effectively been reduced to 'consent."'
Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS & THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 177 (2d ed. 1996).
77. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 235 (2001) (commenting that "the President is not a lawmaker"). As discussed
in greater detail below, because today's trade agreements are far from tariff-focused, one reading suggests
that the Executive has the authority to conclude them as sole executive agreements.
78. Professor Jefferson Powell observes that "the constitutional text enumerates a variety of
powers bearing on [foreign affairs and national security] that it delegates to one or the other political
branch without specifying how the enumerated powers are to be related to one another or organized into
a coherent framework." H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority Over Foreign Affairs in Executive
Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 545 (1999); see also David Gartner, Foreign Relations,
Strategic Doctrine, and Presidential Power, 63 ALA. L. REV. 499, 500 (2012) (discussing the "limited
text in the Constitution allocating power over foreign affairs between the branches of government").
79. Per Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, the President has the "Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. Although it has been
the subject of intense academic and legal debate, the discourse on the treaty power has focused almost
exclusively on its scope and on questions of federalism, rather than the separation of powers dilemma that
has grown around particular areas of foreign relations. Exceptionally, see Oona Hathaway et al., The
Treaty Power: Its History, Scope, and Limits, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2013) and Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867 (2005). Alexander Hamilton called
the Treaty Clause "one of the best digested and most unexceptionable parts of the plan." THE FEDERALIST
No. 75, at 417 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter d., 1999). Indeed, it was the federalism question
that occupied the Founders. The two-thirds senatorial consent rule, the highest requirement in the
Constitution among congressional votes, was the structural check on the Executive, intended to give the
states a voice in the treaty-making process and accommodate values of federalism and democracy. See
Hathaway et al., supra, at 242 (commenting that "a key concern about the treaty power was that it would
give the federal government the power to cede territory of a state to a foreign nation without the consent
of that state").
80. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 79, at 419.
81. Id. at 418.
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commerce.2 Rather, the authors envisioned a broad treaty power. According
to David Golove's primary historical research, the Founders envisioned that "the
power ... would extend as far as was customary under international practice."84
Notwithstanding the treaty's flexibility in subject matter and the
accommodation of both branches, that the United States would enter into
contracts with other nations regulating foreign commerce as well as other diverse
areas loosely related to the removal of tariff barriers challenged, at a minimum,
the efficacy of trade treaty-making in the post-World War II trading
environment. The government undertook two institutional changes to address
this dilemma.
The first major change was to create a Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations (STR), a position first called for by Congress in the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962.85 The STR (now called "the USTR") came to serve as
the intermediary between the legislature and the Executive on trade issues and,
under the Trade Act of 1974, was directly accountable to both the President and
Congress for its trade responsibilities.86 As I have discussed elsewhere, these
moves reflected a congressional interest in enhancing executive authority while
also maintaining control on the Executive's work in the trade space.
The second major change was the implementation of a procedural
framework then known as "fast track authority." "Fast track" is the colloquial
name for TPA and was first contemplated in the Trade Act of 1974.8 In general
terms, in TPA legislation, Congress invites the President to initiate negotiations
with trading partners and sets the terms of engagement between itself and the
executive branch for the period of negotiations.89
In the original 1974 Act, Congress urged the President "to take all
appropriate and feasible steps within his power . . . to harmonize, reduce, or
eliminate ... barriers to (and other distortions of) international trade." Congress
82. Saikrishna Prakash and Michael D. Ramsey observe that "there is no adequate explanation
of the source and scope of the foreign affairs powers of the President." See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note
77, at 233. In one of its more controversial decisions, the Supreme Court has said that, in the "external
realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power
to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. . . . [H]e alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation
the Senate cannot intrude. . . ." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
83. David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075, 1134 (2000).
84. Id. That practice extends back long before the Founders. Focusing on trade, for one,
commercial interactions between and among quasi-sovereigns in the era of the Greeks contributed to the
earliest known "international" trade agreements. WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN, A SPLENDID EXCHANGE: How
TRADE SHAPED THE WORLD 20-21 (2008). In fourth-century Athens and Thessaly, executives negotiated
broad non-military agreements that regulated their trade relations. Those related to the mutual protection
of commerce had a specialized Greek word. The Romans likewise entered into executive commercial
agreements. COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND
ROME 60, 114, 375 (1911).
85. Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.).
86. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. ch. 12).
87. Claussen, Trading Spaces, supra note 23, at 350-54.
88. In my earlier work, I have summarized the historical and legal foundations for fast-track,
drawing together critical conclusions from other scholars. Id at 351-52 n. 18.
89. The language is necessarily imprecise. Constitutionally, the President does not need
congressional authorization to enter into negotiations, nor does TPA encourage the President to pursue
negotiations in any express terms.
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then specifically authorized the President to enter into trade agreements for a
short-term period of five years:
Whenever the President determines that any existing duties or other import
restrictions .... [or] barriers to (or other distortions of) international trade of any
foreign country or the United States unduly burden and restrict the foreign trade of
the United States or adversely affect the United States economy, . . .the President,
during the 5-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, may
enter into trade agreements with foreign countries . . . providing for the
harmonization, reduction, or elimination of such barriers (or other distortions) or
providing for the prohibition of or limitations on the imposition of such barriers (or
other distortions).
TPA then provides for the President o present to Congress an implementing bill
for the resulting trade agreement, which is referred to as a congressional-
executive agreement. Congress votes on the agreement without any opportunity
for amendment o the agreement itself.
Thus, the special procedure set out in TPA gives the U.S. trade agreement
a somewhat unique status in U.S. law.91 The constitutional (and drafting
materials'92) silence on how other types of agreements and compacts would be
made on behalf of the United States left the door open to creative arrangements.93
Today, the congressional-executive agreement and the USTR are fixtures in the
U.S. trade lawmaking regime.
Edmund Sim calls TPA a "simple answer to a complex problem."94 Harold
Koh's depiction, by contrast, is anything but simple: "an accelerated process that
results from self-imposed congressional limits upon ordinary committee
deliberation, committee and floor amendment, and filibuster, that effectively
bundles disparate substantive provisions together in a take-it-or-leave-it
package."95 The U.S. political apparatus managed to codify, on a time-bound
basis, highly structured conversations between the branches through which the
shared authority between the legislature and the Executive is activated and
played out. Scholars have nevertheless debated the constitutional legitimacy of
TPA's structural arrangement.96 Among those applauding the framework for its
90. Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 101-02, 88 Stat. 1978, 1982-83 (1975).
91. For a summary of the legal and historical debates on congressional-executive agreements,
see Claussen, Trading Spaces, supra note 23, at 353 n.22 and accompanying text.
92. See John Linarelli, International Trade Relations and the Separation of Powers Under the
United States Constitution, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. REV. 203, 224 (1995) ("Hardly anything can be found in
the documentation relating to the drafting of the Constitution so as to glean any intent on the separation
of powers in the area of foreign commerce.").
93. See generally David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791
(1998) (suggesting the indeterminate language of the Treaty Clause legitimizes congressional-executive
agreements).
94. Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the Fast-Track for International Trade Agreements, 5 FLA.
INT'L L.J. 471, 521 (1990).
95. Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
143, 163 (1992) (emphasis omitted).
96. On the constitutional questions, see Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA
Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REv. 799 (1995); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1221 (1995);
Detlev F. Vagts, The Exclusive Treaty Power Revisited, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 40 (1995). As James Varellas
notes, Tribe "staked out the position of 'treaty exclusivity' arguing that the Treaty Clause's requirement
that two-thirds of the senators present approve treaties proscribed full-stop the use of [congressional-
332 [Vol. 43: 2
Separation of Trade Law Powers
resolution of the constitutional quandary, Bruce Ackerman and David Golove go
as far as to call TPA "one of the great successes of modem American
government."9 7 TPA created the framework to fill the constitutional gap on
foreign commerce. Finding a workable balance in this area of shared power is
critical to trade law because, as the next Section begins to illustrate, the balance
has a substantial impact on trade law outcomes.
Beyond its navigating the U.S. constitutional issue, TPA's most important
perceived contribution has been to front-load conversations between the
Executive and Congress, providing foreign trading partners with some
expectation of outcome on an expedited timeline.98 The legislation provides trade
agreements a special status, facilitated by a special envoy, the USTR. Through
TPA, in some respects, Congress provides "prospective advice and consent,"
similar to what Jean Galbraith has proposed for other types of treaties.99 But in
so doing, the TPA process also has led to unforeseen consequences for those
agreements. To better understand the relationship between TPA and repetitive
agreement ext, I review in the next Section some of the key features of TPA.
B. Features of TPA
TPA has two sets of features: those that are structural and those that are
substantive. The structural features, along the lines of what Aaron-Andrew Bruhl
calls "statutized rules," govern how Congress handles the procedure of trade
agreement negotiations. 0 0
1. Negotiation Procedure
A study of the TPA provisions over the years demonstrates that Congress
executive agreements] . . . [while] Ackerman and Golove . .. defend the prevailing position that 'the
Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an altemative to the treaty method in every instance."'
James J. Varellas, The Constitutional Political Economy of Free Trade: Reexamining NAFTA-Style
Congressional-Executive Agreements, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 717, 721 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
Koh comments that the subsequent "overwhelming consensus in the legal academy" rejected Tribe's view
in favor of a practice permitting binding agreements to be approved by majorities of both houses of
Congress. Harold Hongju Koh, Address: Twenty-First-Century International Lawmaking, 101 GEO. L.J.
ONLINE 1, 6 (2012). In the earlier days, the Supreme Court addressed the Executive's foreign affairs
authority, upholding the delegation to the Executive, causing Assistant Secretary of State Francis B. Sayre
to comment that it was "clear beyond the shadow of a doubt that Congress may constitutionally authorize
the President to conclude executive agreements which bind the United States without the necessity of
subsequent Senate approval and that the President has authority to enter into certain classes of agreements
independently of Congressional authorization." Francis B. Sayre, The Constitutionality of the Trade
Agreements Act, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 751, 758 (1939).
97. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 96, at 906.
98. David Gantz points out that "most foreign governments are unwilling to complete
substantive trade negotiations with the United States in the absence of TPA." David A. Gantz, The
"Bipartisan Trade Deal," Trade Promotion Authority and the Future of US. Free Trade Agreements, 28
ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 115, 131 (2008). Meredith Kolsky Lewis adds that "as a practical matter TPA
is seen as all but necessary to get any trade agreements enacted." Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific
Partnership, supra note 22, at 46 (footnote omitted). This is borne out by the Obama Administration's
fulfilling all of the TPA requirements even before TPA was on the congressional radar for the TPP. Id. at
47.
99. Jean Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 247 (2012).
100. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation
ofPowers, and the Rules ofProceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 346 (2003).
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uses TPA to maintain close control over the Executive in the trade agreement
negotiating context. Beginning with the 1974 Act, the President was obligated to
consult with relevant committees during the negotiations and to notify Congress
ninety calendar days before signing an agreement.101 The Act provided for ten
"congressional delegates to negotiations" to be "accredited by the President as
official advisers to the United States delegations to international conferences,
meetings, and negotiation sessions relating to trade agreements."10 2
Following its introduction in the Trade Act of 1974, TPA (still then known
as "fast track") was renewed in the Trade Act of 1979 to enable more rounds of
negotiation in the creation of various parts of what would become the World
Trade Organization. In 1983, following the Supreme Court's ruling in
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,03 Congress revisited the bi-
branch trade lawmaking structure in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.104 There,
Congress required the President o notify the House Ways and Means Committee
and the Senate Finance Committee of his intention to begin negotiations sixty
days prior to the start of negotiations.o The Act also provided for denial of the
expedited procedures if either committee disapproved of the negotiation within
that sixty-day period.o6
The expedited authority was again renewed in the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988.107 That Act provided that Congress could withhold
a trade agreement from fast track consideration by passing a resolution of
disapproval under certain conditions.108 Writing in 1992, Harold Koh identified
twelve possible leverage points Congress had against the Executive at that stage
in the evolution of TPA, each enabled by particular reporting and consulting
requirements or similar obligations in the legislation.109 TPA was briefly
extended again in 1993 for the consideration and implementation of the NAFTA.
The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 brought back fast
track for the first time in eight years with a stronger congressional role.1 10 Even
101. Pub. L. No. 93-618 (1975), § 102(e)(1). The President was also required to provide
information to the International Trade Commission, an independent body, for advice, just as he was
required to seek information and advice from relevant departments in the executive branch. The role of
the International Trade Commission and certain other executive agencies in the trade lawmaking process
is not taken up here, but the diversity of contributions to a text even within the executive branch is notable.
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative receives considerable technical, administrative, scientific,
and economic guidance in undertaking the negotiation and conclusion of congressional-executive
agreements.
102. Id. § 161(a).
103. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
104. Koh maintains that the Chadha decision prompted Congress to seize more effective control
over trade lawmaking through the use of functional substitutes to Congress's prior legislative vetoes. Koh,
supra note 16, at 1211, 1216-19; see also Bruhl, supra note 100, at 347 (describing how fast track rules
"can act as a close substitute for the legislative veto").
105. Pub. L. No. 98-573 (1984), § 401(a).
106. Id.
107. Notably, the expedited procedures are statutized and not subject to the sunset provision; only
the authority to use them is time limited.
108. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(1988).
109. Koh, supra note 95, at 150-57.
110. See Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933
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the name of the legislation itself suggests a shorter or tighter leash for the
Executive-emphasis on "authority.""' The 2002 legislation enacted a number
of changes to the process, bringing the President closer still to a congressional
itinerary. For example, the Act required the President o submit reports when the
implementing bill was submitted to Congress for approval, explaining how the
FTA makes progress toward TPA objectives. It provided that in the course of
negotiations, the USTR must not only consult with the designated congressional
committees but also must engage in "regular and detailed briefs" with
congressional advisers-a "Congressional Oversight Group"-and future
consultation before initiating negotiations. 112
The 2002 TPA expired in 2007 and was not revived until late 2015,
although President Barack Obama requested TPA for purposes of finalizing the
TPP as early as July 30, 2013.113 The 2015 TPA legislation incorporates still
more executive discretion-controlling tools including additional congressional
consultations during negotiations; additional consultations prior to entry into
force; other "enhanced coordination with Congress"; and additional consultation
with congressional advisers throughout the process.1 14 Further, Congress has
reserved the right to change the rules at any time under TPA and occasionally
has done so along the way.'15 Each TPA statute remains enshrined in individual
chapters of Title 19 of the U.S. Code.116
The record is unequivocal in demonstrating an escalation of congressional
control mechanisms over the history of the TPA procedure. That statement is
true even without taking into account engagement between the branches that is
not codified or required. In addition to the procedures defined in the TPA
legislation, Congress and the Executive have followed certain unwritten rules of
engagement. Through these customs, the Executive seeks to keep the relevant
congressional stakeholders apprised and appeased.1 17 For example, the House
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801-13); see also Laura L. Wright, Trade Promotion Authority: Fast Trackfor
the Twenty-First Century, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 979, 989 (2004).
111. The term "trade promotion authority" (TPA) was first used in this Act.
112. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3804, 3807. Although the statute does not make specific mention of approval
of trade agreements by majority vote of both houses, as a doctrinal matter, it is accepted almost
universally. See, e.g., Ackerman & Golove, supra note 96, at 803 ("This framework [approval of
agreements by majority vote of both houses] has proved remarkably successful-to the point where it is
now taken for granted by all foreign-trade professionals.").
113. Rossella Brevetti, Obama Calls for Trade Promotion Authority Combined with Trade
Adjustment Assistance, INT'L TRADE DAILY (July 31, 2013). According to David Gantz, "the United
States' negotiating abilities were severely hampered" by the lack of TPA before June 2015 because "only
TPA encourages the United States' negotiating partners to give their final, best positions on contentious
issues by assuring them that once a trade agreement is concluded it will not be amended nor indefinitely
delayed by the Congress." David A. Gantz, The TPP and RCEP: Mega-Trade Agreements for the Pacific
Rim, 33 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 57, 61 (2015).
114. Pub. L. No. 114-26 (2015), § 104.
115. Congress changed some of the rules in 2008 in the course of its consideration of the U.S.-
Colombia FTA. See IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33743, TRADE PROMOTION
AUTHORITY AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 9 n.18 (2015).
116. 1974 is Chapter 12; 1979 is Chapter 13; 1988 is Chapter 17; 2002 is Chapter 24; and 2015
is Chapter 27.
117. Some members of Congress are asking for still more. See Jenny Leonard & Dan Dupont,
House Democrats Call for Greater Congressional Authority, More Enforcement in Future Deals, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE (Mar. 28, 2017).
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Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee sometimes
engage in "markup sessions" during which they review the draft implementing
bill in conversation with the USTR.
The original "fast track" arrangement was devised at a time when the
country was wrestling with suspicions and skepticism toward executive power.
By one characterization, the 1974 Act was "wreathed with provisions that
manifested Congress' pervasive post-Watergate, post-Vietnam distrust of
unchecked executive discretion in foreign affairs: specified negotiating
objectives; . . . [and] extensive consultation, certification and reporting
requirements."118 Notwithstanding the passage of time since that low period in
the trust of the Executive, the number and forms of congressional requirements
for executive engagement have only increased.
2. Substantive Features
Beyond the congressional-executive structural components of TPA are the
lesser-studied substantive components. At the heart of these provisions are the
"overall" and "principal" negotiating objectives to guide the President in
concluding agreements. These objectives guide the Executive in the types of
provisions that Congress wishes to see and apply regardless of the trading partner
or partners with whom the Executive negotiates.119
Over the years, Congress has added lengthy negotiating objectives specific
to each chapter.1 2 0 In the 1974 Act, the chapter-specific objectives were short
and general in nature. Only four subject areas were covered specifically. The
same is true for the objectives that followed in the renewed legislation, until 1988
when there were at least sixteen sectors or topic areas for which Congress
articulated objectives. The 1988 legislation was the first to include labor and
environment provisions among the principal negotiating objectives:
The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding worker rights
are-(A) to promote respect for worker rights; (B) to secure a review of the
relationship of worker rights to GATT articles, objectives, and related instruments
with a view to ensuring that the benefits of the trading system are available to all
workers; and (C) to adopt, as a principle of the GATT, that the denial of worker
118. Koh, supra note 95, at 145.
119. In 1974, the overall objectives included: "(1) to foster the economic growth of and full
employment in the United States and to strengthen economic relations between the United States and
foreign countries through open and nondiscriminatory world trade; (2) to harmonize, reduce, and eliminate
barriers to trade . . . ; (3) to establish fairness and equity in international trading relations . . . ; (4) to
provide adequate procedures to safeguard American industry and labor against unfair or injurious import
competition .. .; (5) to open up market opportunities for United States commerce . . ; (6) to provide fair
and reasonable access to products of less developed countries in the United States market." Pub. L. No.
93-618.
120. Although Congress does not undertake its legislative drafting responsibility in the absence
of consultation with the executive branch and the President signs TPA into law, I attribute here the "overall
negotiating objectives" primarily to Congress for at least two reasons. First, these objectives often span
the lifetimes of more than one presidential administration. Thus, even if the Executive contributed to the
policy that shaped some of the language, it is likely that a different chief Executive must execute it.
Second, U.S. courts treat legislation largely as the product of Congress, given that the Constitution
likewise treats U.S. law that way. Moreover, the USTR often issues its own agreement-specific
negotiating objectives that differ from those in TPA.
336 [Vol. 43: 2
Separation of Trade Law Powers
rights should not be a means for a country or its industries to gain competitive
advantage in international trade.121
This Act set the stage for the NAFTA negotiations as well as the negotiation of
the NAALC and NAAEC.
The 2002 TPA legislation-the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act
of 2002--continued to substantially expand the objectives to cover still more
topics. It included specific, lengthy negotiating objectives for each chapter,
including the labor and environment chapters. Among other "principal
negotiating objectives for labor," the 2002 Act provides:
(A) to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the United States does not fail to
effectively enforce its environmental or labor laws, through a sustained or recurring
course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the United States
and that party after entry into force of a trade agreement between those countries;
(B) to recognize that parties to a trade agreement retain the right to exercise
discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance
matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement
with respect to other labor or environmental matters determined to have higher
priorities, and to recognize that a country is effectively enforcing its laws if a course
of action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from
a bona fide decision regarding the allocation of resources, and no retaliation may be
authorized based on the exercise of these rights or the right to establish domestic
labor standards and levels of environmental protection.122
These paragraphs follow the U.S.-Jordan FTA labor chapter language almost
exactly. Most important, the 2002 Act also included an objective to treat all
principal negotiating objectives equally with respect to dispute settlement,
incorporating the milestone of the U.S.-Jordan FTA that had been successfully
negotiated by the Clinton Administration.
Thereafter, the FTAs that were negotiated under the 2002 TPA legislation
and concluded before 2007 all include the TPA "objectives" language in labor
and environment as binding commitments. In other words, the language of those
trade agreements i  consistent with the TPA legislation authorizing the President
to negotiate those agreements in the first place. While correlation is not
causation, it is notable that among the many trade agreements negotiated over
the last twenty years, the U.S.-Jordan FTA stands out as the only one to be
negotiated and implemented outside the TPA framework. Thus, the greatest
gains in terms of change to the labor and environment chapters in recent years
came from the only agreement not negotiated under TPA. There, the Executive
was not obligated to follow any congressionally set blueprint. On that rare
occasion, the Executive set the agenda and made a notable advance. The new
additions to that agreement were then incorporated into statute in the subsequent
TPA legislation.
The 2002 TPA was due to expire at a time when four negotiated agreements
had not yet made it through Congress. As a result of the delicate political
121. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1101(b)(14), 102
Stat. 1107, 1125 (1988).
122. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2102(b)(1 1),
116 Stat. 933, 1000 (2002).
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situation at the time, a bipartisan deal was required before the agreements that
had been negotiated-those with Peru, Colombia, Panama, and South Korea-
would enter into force. It was these developments that prompted the May 10 deal
noted above. Although that deal and its precise language were not captured by
statute, the understanding between the branches was that the terms of May 10
(stronger labor and environment enforcement mechanisms among them) would
be incorporated into the Executive's negotiations. 123 These agreements were then
re-negotiated to incorporate those agreed-upon changes.
The next iteration of TPA, enacted in 2015, adopted and codified those
principles,124 bringing the full length of congressional objectives for the
President to fourteen printed pages of legislation.12 5 The TPP labor and
environment chapters tracked the 2015 TPA with only small modifications.126
Thus, across the last twenty years, the text of each FTA's labor and environment
chapters has closely resembled the negotiating objective language of its
applicable TPA legislation.
The negotiating objectives provided by Congress are ostensibly intended
to provide guidelines for the executive branch to consider in negotiating FTAs.1 27
In fact, for the high consistency chapters, the language of the agreement has been
lifted verbatim from the "objectives" as stated in the TPA legislation. This is not
to suggest hat the Executive does not engage with Congress as the legislature
drafts and enacts these objectives into law. However, it is clear that Congress
holds both the pen and the final word through TPA.1 28
123. In itself, the May 10 agreement-the negotiated soft law between Congress and the
Executive-is worth further study. For a primer, see Gantz, supra note 98. Query whether the May 10
compromise is now broken following the In the Matter of Guatemala CAFTA-DR labor case. See, e.g.,
Celeste Drake, U.S. Trade Policy Fails Workers, AFL-CIO (June 26, 2017), https://aflcio.org/2017/6/26/
us-trade-policy-fails-workers (commenting on how the May 10 compromise is no longer sufficient as
demonstrated by the Panel's high bar for its interpretation in the case between the United States and
Guatemala).
124. For example, the labor chapters in those agreements require the parties to maintain in their
law and practice five basic internationally recognized labor principles, and the environment chapters
incorporate specific multilateral environmental agreements. Importantly, the May 10 deal also made the
labor and environment obligations fully enforceable on par with commercial provisions. See Gantz, supra
note 98, at 150.
125. New provisions were added to address digital trade, State-owned enterprises, regulatory
transparency, and currency.
126. For example:
Article 19.5.1: No Party shall fail to effectively enforce its labour laws through a sustained or
recurring course of action or inaction in a manner affecting trade or investment between the
Parties after the date of entry into force of this Agreement.
Article 19.5.2: . . . Each Party retains the right to exercise reasonable enforcement discretion
and to make bona fide decisions with regard to the allocation of enforcement resources
between labour enforcement activities among the fundamental labour ights and acceptable
conditions of work enumerated in Article 19.3.1 (Labour Rights) and Article 19.3.2, provided
that the exercise of that discretion, and those decisions, are not inconsistent with its obligations
under this Chapter.
Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 8.
127. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-439, FOUR FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS GAO
REVIEWED HAVE RESULTED IN COMMERCIAL BENEFITS, BUT CHALLENGES ON LABOR AND
ENVIRONMENT REMAIN 9-10 (2009). President George W. Bush attested in June 2005 that the FTAs
advanced TPA's U.S. commercial objectives. Id. at 11-12.
128. To be sure, simply following the congressional objectives verbatim is not a guarantee of
acceptance and implementation of an agreement. The TPP is one among a few examples of agreements
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III. TRADE AGREEMENT DESIGN THEORY
Studying the intersection of substance and structure in TPA helps shed light
on the landscape of consistency observed in trade agreements. Koh notes that
TPA "creates moral commitments, mutual assurances, credible threats, and
settled expectations among the branches in the trade field."1 29 In fact, it does
much more. This Part sets out how, what I term, "structural institutionalist"
theory, which focuses on the separation of powers between Congress and the
Executive, provides the best explanation for the consistency in U.S. trade
agreement design.130 I then turn to competing theories and lessons to be learned
from those theories' contributions.
A. Structural Institutionalism
Taken together, the review in Part II of the TPA framework features a
number of strong indicators that the current congressional-executive structural
relationship is contributing to path dependence in our trade agreements. As
scholars of path dependence have acknowledged, "When certain actors are in a
position to impose rules on others, the employment of power may be self-
reinforcing. Actors may use political authority to generate changes in the rules
of the game (both informal institutions and various public policies) designed to
enhance their power."3 1 Congressional activity in the trade lawmaking space has
lived up to this prediction. As TPA has evolved and Congress has taken on a
greater role, those moral commitments, mutual assurances, and credible threats
have become more entrenched and more inflexible.
1. Congressional Monopoly
The high-consistency chapters in U.S. trade agreements are not just
consistent with one another but are also locked-in with TPA, whereas the
moderate-consistency chapters appear to use the TPA negotiating objectives as
exactly that: objectives. In the areas of labor and environment, both of which
benefit from strong interest groups and suffer from a bipartisan divide, Congress
is itself more constrained and therefore binds the Executive more than in other
chapters. In areas such as IP and dispute settlement, where interest group
influence is more nuanced and less categorical, Congress is less constrained and
can afford the Executive greater flexibility. As these preferences are processed
through the legislative machinery, they generate certain defined spaces for the
that tracked the congressionally mandated language and still was not implemented by the Congress
thereafter. But not following congressional objectives may pose an even greater risk of non-acceptance.
129. Koh, supra note 95, at 161.
130. Randy Kozel used the term "structural institutionalism" to refer to a "conception of the
constitutional order in which various institutions outside the realm of political government 'develop their
own visions of what the First Amendment means."' Randy J. Kozel, Institutional Autonomy and
Constitutional Structure, 112 MICH. L. REv. 957, 958 (2014) (citation omitted). I am using the term to
capture an emphasis on structural constraints within an institutionalist analysis.
131. Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study ofPolitics, 94 AM. POL.
SC. REv. 251, 259 (2000) (citation omitted). E.E. Schattschneider asserted: "New policies create a new
politics." E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURE AND THE TARIFF 288 (1935).
2018] 339
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
development of policy.'32
Congress appears to have been less influential on an administration's
approach to the IP chapter compared to the labor and environment chapters.
Other than in the area of pharmaceuticals, the advocacy community for IP issues
is more diffuse and maintains a weaker lobby among members of Congress than
in labor and environment.13 3 This nuanced lobby could have a differential impact
in the course of the many congressional-executive conversations set out by TPA.
With respect to the content of the dispute settlement chapter, the probability of
congressional capture is similarly low, and USTR as well as foreign negotiating
partners may be able to modify the dispute settlement terms in a non-
controversial way.
A tentative conclusion, therefore, is that the consistency in trade agreement
chapters may be differentiated by levels of congressional capture. To the extent
this is correct, it is historically incongruous. Cory Adkins and David Singh
Grewal trace how early delegations to the President in the area of foreign
commerce were seen as helping to shield trade policymaking from the dangers
of interest groups in addition to being more responsive to the exigencies of
foreign commercial relations.13 4 The interdisciplinary scholarship on interest
groups and capture similarly points to a differential in this respect. Adkins and
Grewal conclude that TPA procedures allow the federal government "to advance
a unified agenda for international trade with less risk of its being hijacked by
particular (i.e., sectional or minority) interests."1 35 This review suggests that
another type of hijacking is going on, one that is made manifest in the paralysis
of language in the resulting agreements. Whether congressional capture is the
precise explanation for the differentiation across the landscape, the overall trend
toward consistency does appear to have to do with greater congressional
involvement. In other words, the structure in which Congress seeks to maintain
tight control appears to lend itself to capture and, therefore, paralysis.
The appearance of congressionally-prescribed agreement language is not
the only indication of the congressional influence on U.S. trade agreements.
Negotiators confirm that, through TPA, Congress maintains a heavy role in U.S.
132. This hypothesis embraces first principles from Philip Frickey and Daniel Farber's iteration
of public choice theory, drawing from the republicanism literature to conclude that the government is
actively processing preferences in its construction of policy. See DANIEL FARBER & PHILIP FRICKEY, LAW
AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 58 (1991). Moreover, repeat players in the advocacy
space quickly adapt to the TPA framework and maximize it to their benefit. For a discussion of how trade
interest groups mobilize easily, see Jide Nzelibe, The Breakdown of International Treaties, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1173 (2018).
133. M.J. Durkee recently observed that the effects of business and other advocate participation
in treaty-making is under-studied. See M.J. Durkee, The Business of Treaties, 63 UCLA L. REV. 264, 267
(2016). Economists have also examined the roles of special interest groups in the trade lawmaking and
policymaking spaces. Most notably, Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman's work in the mid-1990s
provided a foundation for understanding how the branches work together with industry and their lobbies.
See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protection for Sale, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 833 (1994).
134. See Cory Adkins & David Singh Grewal, Two Views of International Trade, 94 TEx. L.
REV. 1495, 1499 (2016); see also Jide Nzelibe, The Illusion of the Free Trade Constitution, 19 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 6 (2016) ("The primary justification for supporting delegation of trade authority
to the President revolves around the perceived need to suppress the role of special interest groups in trade
policy.").
135. See Adkins & Grewal, supra note 134, at 1499.
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negotiating work. Robert Strauss, Special Trade Representative during the
Tokyo Round GATT negotiations, commented that he spent as much time with
domestic stakeholders and members of Congress as with foreign partners.13 6 As
one prominent foreign negotiator put it: "[W]hen you negotiate with the United
States, you have no choice but to negotiate with the administration, but also with
the United States Congress . . . ."137 The experience of those negotiators is
consistent with outcomes predicted by Kristina Daugirdas: "When Congress
pays sustained attention to a single issue or instruction over time, the executive
branch will feel more pressure to demonstrate responsiveness to Congress's
instructions . . . ."138
Members of Congress have themselves acknowledged the significant
influence Congress plays in U.S. trade agreements and Congress's substantive
prerogatives through TPA. In the spring 2002 congressional hearings regarding
the possibility of enacting TPA legislation, Senator Chris Dodd referred to
"Congress's role in helping to craft the final language of trade agreements over
the past 8 years [which] developed new international norms."'3 9 Such an
affirmation is not the type of statement one typically sees from members of
Congress in respect of other areas of international law. Senator Dodd went on to
discuss the difficulty President George W. Bush would face if certain points did
not find their way into the congressional objectives:
There are 27 pages of negotiating objectives covering every imaginable issue ...
involving insurance, and e-commerce, technology, and the like. . . . Since neither the
House bill nor the Senate bill includes the Jordan labor standards or something
comparable, the President may not be in a position to prevent our trading partners
from violating domestic laws ... 140
The implication of the Senator's remarks is that because Congress did not
expressly include language in the TPA legislation, the Executive would be
limited in putting that language into a final agreement. In 2018, the Chairman of
the House Ways and Means Committee Kevin Brady bluntly told the USTR that
Congress was the USTR's "client" and described his expectation that the USTR
would negotiate the NAFTA 2.0 to include an investment chapter as Congress
had dictated.141
The works of political scientists Thomas Schelling and Robert Putnam seek
to support a claim that legislative constraint on the Executive can serve as
136. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
INT'L ORG. 427, 433 (1988).
137. Tommy Koh, The USSFTA: A Personal Perspective, in THE UNITED STATES SINGAPORE
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: HIGHLIGHTS AND INSIGHTS 3, 10 (Tommy Koh & Chang Li Lin eds., 2004).
The AFL-CIO attributes some of the problem to a lack of change in the TPA objectives. See AFL-CIO,
supra note 58.
138. Daugirdas, supra note 17, at 554.
139. 148 CONG. REc. 4825 (2002) (Statement of Sen. Dodd).
140. Id. At that point, the bill that passed the House and Senate did not include the Jordan
language. Senator Dodd also referred to the "evolutionary process" through which the Jordan standards
could be incorporated into TPA. Id.
141. Dan Dupont, Lighthizer, Brady Square Off Over ISDS at Ways & Means Trade Hearing,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Mar. 22, 2018).
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leverage for a party at the negotiating table.142 Schelling and Putnam maintain
that Congress acts as a helpful check on an otherwise unconstrained executive
negotiator in securing State priorities.143 The tighter Congress draws the box, the
less the executive branch negotiator can operate outside those lines, which in
turn restricts foreign partners' ability to structure an agreement or include
language according to their preferences.144
U.S. trade negotiations confirm Schelling and Putnam's understanding, but
also its drawbacks. The United States maintains significant control in its
conversations with foreign partners about trade agreements out of the necessity
of securing congressional approval under the TPA framework. This necessity
has allowed the United States to secure terms favorable to U.S. stakeholders. My
review of U.S. trade agreements over the last twenty years confirms that outcome
but adds a further detail of note: it is not simply where Congress is engaged that
the Executive is more constrained; rather, there is equally a range of
congressional involvement activating different levers in the TPA framework that
affects the Executive's constraints.14 5 Where stakeholders have a stronger hold
on Congress, the Executive is more limited. Put simply, as a result of the current
framework for congressional-executive shared power, in certain chapters, the
congressional negotiating objectives in TPA and other congressionally
sanctioned language in TPA have come to serve as both the floor and the ceiling
for U.S. trade agreements.
Thus, the outcomes in U.S. trade agreements appear to be shaped in
specific and systemic ways by institutional forces. At least five factors discussed
above support this conclusion: first, the verbatim use of TPA legislation as
enforceable obligations on States in the agreements; second, the correlation
between the congressional involvement in the chapter and the space for
innovation; third, negotiator statements confirming the congressional role;
fourth, congressional statements affirming Congress's trong role; and, fifth, the
fact that the greatest strides in the politicized chapters occurred in the case of the
one chapter that did not go through TPA. As compared to other possible
142. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 28 (1980); Putnam, supra note
136.
143. Importantly, scholars have tested this thesis in later years, concluding that the relative
influence of domestic politics is far more complex than Schelling and Putnam's model lets on. For
example, Keisuke lida concludes that perceptions of domestic constraints are just as important as the
actual constraints themselves. Keisuke lida, When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?: Two-Level
Games with Uncertainty, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 403 (1993); see also Ahmer Tarar, International
Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints, 45 J. CONFLICT REsOL. 320 (2001) (analyzing a model
where both negotiators are constrained).
144. Building off the work of Schelling and Putnam, Oona Hathaway articulates that "the
presence of constraints on a President [here, a limited model] has the potential to make him stronger, not
weaker, at the bargaining table-and better able to strike the best deal for U.S. national interests." Oona
Hathaway, Presidential Power Over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 236
(2009).
145. Notably, the chapters of greatest U.S. dominance are areas of least consensus at the WTO.
In this sense, the United States has been called a "norm entrepreneur." See, e.g., Julien Sylvestre Fleury
& Jean-Michel Marcoux, The U.S. Shaping ofState-Owned Enterprise Disciplines in the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, 19 J. INT'L ECON. L. 445, 447-48 (2016).
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explanations, the volume and quality of indicators appear to point to these forces
as the most salient cause of the consistency. When one considers the many
specific ideas that did not make their way into any agreements and the realm of
possibilities for the standards in our trade agreements,14 6 as well as the
improvements on ambiguous language that have gone uncorrected from one
agreement to the next, the generic uniformity is increasingly concerning.
2. Toward a Principal-Agent Relationship?
Today, in light of the constricting steps taken by Congress, the Executive
acts in some respects like an agent of Congress in trade lawmaking rather than
as a partner. Hamilton foresaw an arrangement like this as problematic and
detrimental to U.S. foreign affairs. The President, acting as "the ministerial
servant of the Senate[,] could not be expected to enjoy the confidence and respect
of foreign powers in the same degree with the constitutional representatives of
the nation, and, of course, would not be able to act with an equal degree of weight
or efficacy."1 4 7 Hamilton clearly viewed the Executive as an agent in some
respect and the most fit to carry out foreign transactions and negotiations, but the
role of executive agent in Hamilton's depiction conceives of Congress as the
approver, not necessarily as the drafter. Thus, the tipped balance in trade law is
problematic not because Congress has the lead, but rather because the Executive
has such limited normative discretion in a major foreign policy area. This
institutional arrangement prevents both strategic optimization and innovation.
Although they have varying interests, Congress grants the Executive some
circumscribed discretion and autonomy, and the Executive is intended to act
within that space.148 Here, the situation is further complicated by the fact that
Congress is a collective actor; this exacerbates the Congress's ability to be
responsive, to fully anticipate contingencies both for itself and the Executive,
and likely also to manage their information asymmetry. 149 It is unsurprising that
change is difficult under this arrangement, given the high transaction costs that
constrain Congress in its foreign commercial governance role. As Daugirdas has
illustrated, when it comes to foreign affairs, Congress is "unmotivated[,] ...
ineffective [and] [a]t best, it is relegated to a reactive role."150
146. See supra Part II; see also Jane Rennie, Competition Provisions in Free Trade Agreements:
Unique Responses to Bilateral Needs or Derivative Developments in International Competition Policy,
15 INT'L TRADE L. & REG. 57, 71 (2009) (noting the path-dependent nature of bilateral FTAs whereby
terms become a reflection of common practice rather than of the particular needs of the parties).
147. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 79, at 420. Moreover, the United States would "lose a
considerable advantage in the management of its external concerns, [and] the people would lose the
additional security which would result from the co-operation of the Executive." Id.
148. See Darren G. Hawkins et. al., Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International
Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 3, 7 (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006).
149. Katerina Linos & Jerome Hsiang, Modeling Domestic Politics in International Law
Scholarship, 15 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (2014).
150. Daugirdas, supra note 17, at 510, 518 (footnote omitted). Daugirdas points to the need for
Congress to have "comprehensive, high-quality, and timely information" for its deliberation. Id. at 550.
On this, Hamilton further concurred. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 79, at 420 ("Accurate and
comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a
nice and uniform sensibility to national character; decision, secrecy, and dispatch, are incompatible with
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The use of a principal-agent framework as an analytical tool for
understanding congressional-executive relations in foreign affairs is not entirely
novel in practice or scholarship.'5' However, the conclusion that Congress plays
a remarkably heavy role in our trade negotiations contrasts with the views of
those scholars who see executive aggrandizement in foreign relations law, as
well as with those who view trade negotiations as having the effect of reducing
congressional involvement rather than increasing it. 15 2 Drawing from the
literature on "framework statutes,"'1 53 some commentators have observed that
TPA "establish[es] priorities and give[s] general direction" but nevertheless
leaves the President considerable discretion in the implementation of the
agreements themselves.15 4 Adkins and Grewal characterize the tension this way:
"The broadening of the final [trade agreement] approval process since the mid-
twentieth century thus contrasts with a tightening of control over the formation
of the trade agenda since the 1970s conceived both in terms of objective setting
and textual elaboration."'55 In other words, while more members of Congress are
involved in the expedited final approval of an agreement, fewer are involved in
objective setting and textual elaboration as a result of the concentration of
engagement between the President and select committees. This observation has
led Adkins and Grewal to conclude that the use of Article I legislation in the
trade space "consolidate[s] executive control."5 Undoubtedly, the Executive
exercises important discretion in areas such as the timing of negotiations and on
the genius of a body so variable and so numerous."). Not to mention that, as John Yoo has noted, today,
"the Senate has about fifty percent more members than the first House of Representatives envisioned by
the Constitution, suggesting that the Senate no longer has the small numbers that the Framers believed
necessary for successful diplomacy." John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties: The Constitutionality of
Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 845 (2000).
151. Ed Swaine has described that there was a time when "diplomats were regarded as personal
agents of a head of state, and could be viewed in terms of a conventional principal-agent relationship, but
identifying the principal (conceivably, the head of state, a legislature, or the state itself), the agent . . . ,
and the nature and consequences of delegated authority became less straightforward." Edward T. Swaine,
Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2068 (2003). Daniel Abebe has proposed viewing Congress as
principal and the President as its agent in foreign affairs generally. In contrast to my study, Abebe seeks
to determine "the appropriate level of deference to the President" based on a balancing of internal and
external constraints to "ensure that the President is a faithful agent" while also ensuring the President has
enough "latitude to achieve congressional goals." Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants ofU.S. Foreign
Affairs Law, 49 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 53 (2013).
152. For example, Hathaway concentrates on ex ante congressional-executive agreements, which
allow the President o enter into international agreements with remarkably little congressional oversight.
See Hathaway, supra note 144, at 144-45. Trade agreements, however, require congressional approval of
the resulting agreement. Id. at 263-65. For other examinations of the Executive's dominance in
international lawmaking, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over
International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201 (2018) and Jean Galbraith, International Law and the
Domestic Separation ofPowers, 99 VA. L. REV. 987, 1003-04 (2013) (emphasizing that reliance on past
practice largely explains why the Constitution has been interpreted to grant the Executive broad powers
in foreign affairs).
153. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Using Framework Statutes to Facilitate U.S. Treaty Making, 98
AM. J. INT'L L. 696 (2004); Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes ofFramework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 717, 733-54 (2005) (describing how framework statutes are used in place of substantive
legislation for their (1) symbolism; (2) neutral rules; (3) coordination; (4) entrenchment and
precommitment; and (5) changing the internal balance of power in Congress).
154. HAL S. SHAPIRO, FAST TRACK: A LEGAL, HISTORICAL, AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 20
(2006).
155. Adkins & Grewal, supra note 134, at 1508 (emphasis omitted).
156. Id. at 1514.
Separation of Trade Law Powers
which trading partners to focus. Nevertheless, the overall process-and, more
importantly, a surprising amount of the substance-is dictated by Congress.
Where the Executive as an agent is granted greater latitude with respect to
the text, we tend to see more innovation. Where Congress maintains a tighter
leash, we see less innovation. In those areas, we know Congress does not
accommodate change well. Other innovative moments may be occasions of
"agency slack,"15 1 or instances where the agent takes advantage of the principal's
trust and engages in self-dealing.158
These indications of a principal-agent relationship between Congress and
the Executive in trade lawmaking merit further study. At the least, this depiction
helps to further elaborate the careful contours of the bi-branch interaction.
The account offered in this Article, grounded in structural institutionalism,
explains several features of the current generation of trade agreements. It is not
without its shortcomings, however. For one, I offer a qualitative analysis that
focuses on a particular case study. To better understand the consistency across
trade agreements, I turn here to three other theories that may provide additional
insight on this trend: rational choice (or rational design159) theory and behavioral
economics-which I will treat together-and historical institutionalism, with
which the structural institutionalist theory most closely aligns.
B. Rational Choice and Behavioral Economics Theories
Rational choice theorists vary in their particular approaches to design, but
their fundamental assumption is that States are unitary rational actors and this
explains and predicts behavior in agreement-making, or helps us theorize the best
ways to structure agreements.'60 To rational choice scholars, design choices are
157. Hawkins et al., supra note 148, at 8.
158. Joel P. Trachtman, The Economic Structure ofthe Law ofInternational Organizations, 15
CHI. J. INT'L L. 162, 177 (2014).
159. I draw largely from literature that some have characterized as "rational design"-a school
of thought that relies upon some of the assumptions traditionally associated with rational choice theory
but which focuses in particular on how institutional designers make rational choices. According to rational
design theorists (who focus on States as principal actors), States design instruments and institutions to
further their own goals, just as rational choice theory would predict. See Barbara Koremenos, Charles
Lipson & Duncan Snidal, Rational Design: Looking Back to Move Forward, 55 INT'L ORG. 1051, 1052-
53 (2001); cf Mark S. Copelovitch & Tonya L. Putnam, Design in Context: Existing International
Agreements and New Cooperation, 68 INT'L ORG. 471, 488 (2014) (noting how rationalist approaches,
unlike rational design approaches, often give shorter shrift to context and underlying structures). Thus,
insofar as some international relations and political science scholars have made a distinction between
these two theories, I apply elements of both approaches and seek to disaggregate the State and examine
the role of constituencies that contribute to the design of trade law. The gap between rational choice and
rational design has been identified by others. For instance, Jean Galbraith has highlighted how neither
rational choice nor rational design addresses negotiation decision-making. See Galbraith, supra note 12,
at 345. For simplicity, I will refer to the schools collectively as "rational choice," as other legal scholars
have, though I acknowledge their distinctions. See, e.g., id. I am grateful to Manfred Elsig for elaborating
these distinctions.
160. Robert 0. Keohane, Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and
Limitations, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 308 (2002) (describing how rational choice theorists characterize
States as strategic actors).
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the result of rational purposive interactions among States. 161 But rational choice
theory cannot explain persuasively the consistency trends noted in Part 1. In
particular, trade agreement design deviates from what rational choice theory
would predict in at least two respects.
First, rational choice theory would predict that instruments would be
updated in a way that the parties would view as optimal. Agreements should
evolve to reflect new challenges and better language from lessons learned.
Fundamentally, no such optimization review has occurred. To the extent there
are new chapters or some innovation, negotiators have taken limited steps to
update and modernize. For example, the addition of objectives and chapters on
digital trade reflects a modernization of agreements, although this modernization
is only prospective. No prior administration has revised existing agreements in
this way. The Trump Administration's efforts to "modernize" the NAFTA may
be a step in that direction, but to date, no re-evaluation in a case-by-case manner
has taken place.16 2
A second way in which my results rest uneasily with rational choice theory
involves the lack of customization per trading partner. Rational choice theory
would predict that the United States would seek to maximize an agreement's
utility with respect to a particular trading partner and therefore we should expect
to see differences relevant to the country with which the agreement was
negotiated. Instead, the TPA framework provides the same general structure and
substance regardless of the trading partner. And the resulting agreement, in
respect of its substantive norms and standards, reflects this generality. Few areas
of existing agreements show signs of customization.163
It could be that negotiators believe they have developed a text that has
universal appeal and application and that such a baseline or model text is optimal.
However, this justification-what I will call a "pride" or "gold standard"
variation on rational choice theory-is unlikely to be the best explanation for the
consistency identified in Part I. Trade agreements are a special breed of
contract.164 The parties involved are States, the volumes and prices involved are
large, -and there is no meaningful transnational regulatory body to oversee their
implementation. Given this context, one would expect to see an active response
161. See, e.g., BARBARA KOREMENOS, RATIONAL DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 2
(2001); Galbraith, supra note 12; Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International
Organizations: Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REv. 649, 658 (2006).
162. In fact, the negotiating objectives put forward by the Trump Administration did not appear
to do much to change what has been done in the past. See, e.g., Brett Fortnam, NAFTA Draft Notice
Includes Language Similar to TPP Text on Investment, IP, SOEs, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Mar. 31, 2017).
The Administration notably did not use TPA to negotiate changes to KORUS in 2018. Dan Dupont, U.S.,
Korea to Discuss KORUS "Amendments and Modifications" on Jan. 5, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Dec. 27,
2017).
163. This is obviously not true of the schedules that accompany the agreements, which are
specific to the exports and imports from that country. My focus is on standards and norms in the
lawmaking core of the agreement.
164. See JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 119-49
(2008) (noting the similarities and differences between a treaty and a traditional contract); Lea Brilmayer,
From "Contract" to "Pledge ": The Structure ofInternational Human Rights Agreements, 77 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 163 (2006); Curtis J. Mahoney, Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and the
Interpretation of Treaties, 116 YALE L.J. 824 (2007).
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to negotiating the contractual terms. Instead, the evidence above shows that the
parties often choose only standardized terms without serious consideration of
text that may be considered objectively improved. This stands in contrast to the
practice in other areas of foreign relations such as bilateral investment treaties
and tax conventions. Further, there is not such a limited pool of negotiators
across the many agreements that those negotiators likely would believe this to
be the case. In light of the requests of constituencies, including potential internal
constituencies, the chances that negotiators are uniformly convinced they have
an ideal text seem low.
A second theoretical frame derived from behavioral economics may
provide an additional alternative explanation for trade agreement consistency.
As Galbraith and others have noted, the literature on individual decision-making
and behavioral economics is playing an increasingly important role in
international law scholarship.165 Relevant to this analysis, empirical studies
rooted in behavioral economics show that individuals tend to be biased in favor
of whatever option is framed as the status quo. Here, a status quo bias could
provide a plausible explanation for why executive negotiators bring the same
language to the negotiating table regardless of political direction or who appears
on the other side.166 The reasons for this bias are debated in the literature. In the
preparation of trade agreement language, lawyers and policymakers may be
purposefully risk averse about making changes to prior language in case the
change could be interpreted by a foreign partner, stakeholder, or arbitral tribunal
as a change in meaning that would cast doubt on the meaning of terms in prior
agreements.
That lawyers are risk averse is in some respects related to an additional
possible justification: that the language has yet to be tested. The latter is a theory
of prematurity while the former is rooted in diplomatic concerns. In both,
lawyers and negotiators are reluctant to make any changes without seeing an
advantage to doing so where the language has yet to be contested or even applied.
There is only one U.S. case litigating language from this generation of trade
agreements other than the NAFTA, 167 and even in the case of the NAFTA, the
United States has been party to only three cases.168
The conclusion that negotiators may be reluctant to change language
because that language has not been tested or out of fear that they might anger
other trading partners is supported by the fact that U.S. trade negotiators often
add a phrase such as "for greater certainty" or "for the avoidance of doubt" or
drop a footnote rather than change old language.169 This trend is borne out in the
165. Galbraith, supra note 12, at 351-52.
166. Id. at 359-60.
167. That single case is In the Matter of Guatemala-Issues Relating to the Obligations Under
Article 16.2.] (a) of the CAFTA-DR. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
168. Status Report of Panel Proceedings, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, https://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/Home/Dispute-Settlement/Status-Report-of-Panel-Proceedings (last visited Mar. 18, 2018).
169. Another common approach is to add an annex or other side agreement, as discussed above
in respect of the TPP IP chapters. David Vincent comments that although CAFTA-DR Chapter 10 is
nearly identical to NAFTA's Chapter 11, "it includes a significant addition in its Annex. Annex 10-C
addresses expropriation by further defining and narrowing an investor's ability to recover due to indirect
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TPP draft text in which the phrase "for greater certainty" appears 275 times. Not
all of those instances are situations in which language was sticky and could not
be changed, but many are. Many represent areas where negotiators found it easier
to make a seemingly small adjustment with that chapeau than to improve the
language. These choices again seem contrary to a rational choice paradigm that
would suggest States should be choosing optimal language, not necessarily
clarifying what appears to be substandard language.
Similar trends have been noted in contract negotiations. Even if a contract
template is selected at random, parties tend to shape their subsequent
negotiations around it.170 This explanation seeks to reconcile the behavioral
economics studies with rational choice models. Scholars have termed this
behavior "satisficing," as Lauge Poulsen explains, "because bounded rational
decision-makers seek solutions that are merely 'good enough,' rather than
optimal . .. often lead[ing] to path-dependency over and beyond what would be
predicted in rationalist models."' The boundedness in trade agreement
negotiations is made manifest in multiple ways, most of which will be elaborated
in the next Part. While this justification would explain reluctance to change, it
would again not fully explain a lack of innovation or willingness to
accommodate new non-partisan substantive obligations.
It could be that government actors have other incentives for purposefully
maintaining consistent language. For example, they may find it efficient to
maintain and manage the same language. Or negotiators may find it politically
important to maintain similar expectations internally and externally. That
consistency is a goal for any of these reasons seems to be sensible; however,
these reasons again do little to explain the lack of new additions in key chapters.
If negotiators were striving to maintain expectations or maintain efficiencies, it
should be possible to add new language even if change is difficult. Still, little
new language has been added over the years.
A further explanation that does not fit squarely in either rational choice or
behavior economics is that negotiators may view consistency as an important
value of international lawmaking. The consistency could reflect a desire on the
part of U.S. trade lawmakers to use consistent language out of a commitment to
a singular text that promotes U.S. values. By establishing consistency across
diverse trading partners from around the globe, they may contribute to the
establishment of international standards where the WTO has failed to achieve
consensus.172 Some analysts have long called for greater use of regional and
bilateral agreements as a way of allowing sub-sets of countries to move forward
expropriation." David Vincent, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Environmental Savior or Regulatory
Carte Blanche?, 23 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1, 21 (2014) (citation omitted).
170. Russell B. Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological
Power ofDefault Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1587-91 (1998). See also discussions
about the "endowment effect" of maintaining the status quo in Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch &
Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POLIT.
ECON. 1325, 1348 (1990).
171. LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN, BOUNDED RATIONALITY & ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: THE
POLITICS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 27 (2015).
172. John Whalley describes the "use of regional agreements for tactical purposes by countries
seeking to achieve their multilateral negotiating objectives." Whalley, supra note 3, at 74.
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on an issue where it is clear that there is no consensus among the WTO
membership as a whole. 3 While this could be a value to negotiators,
policymakers have not made this goal express. Even if some negotiators maintain
this view, it does not appear to be among the most prominent bases for the
consistency.
Each of these explanations or justifications takes as its premise that the
consistency is purposefully chosen by the actors engaged in trade lawmaking.
Moreover, while rational choice theory operates under an assumption that he
State is a unitary actor, I suggest that the story is more complicated.
Understanding the trend requires an examination of the role of internal actors as
engines of change and a study of past events. Thus, I turn next to ask whether
historical institutionalism, which focuses on historical development to
understand change, accommodates the U.S. trade lawmaking story.
C. Historical Institutionalism
In contrast to rational choice theory, historical institutionalism maintains
that institutions are largely influenced by historical circumstances. In other
words, "history matters."174 The origin and evolution of institutions are
predictors of current functions and constraints (learning from experience);
however, historical institutionalism is less successful in predicting specific
sources of change.
Historical institutionalists would likely therefore suggest that the origin and
evolution of trade agreements and the institutions that. precipitate trade
agreements are relevant to shaping the functions that the agreements purport to
serve.175 Rather than purposive development, according to this view, trade
agreements may be the product of possibly haphazard, inefficient, entrenched
institutions. Inferior agreement designs can become embedded through self-
reinforcing processes and institutions. Under this theory, the consistency in U.S.
trade agreements is not coincidental or even purposeful among individual
negotiators. Rather, a central claim of historical institutionalism is that outcomes
are shaped by prior outcomes. Thus, historical institutionalists would propose
that the current trade agreement design is the product of the choices made in prior
negotiations. Opportunities for significant change are brief, intermittent, and
critical junctures.176
Historical institutionalism's attenuated path dependence is attractive as an
explanation for the consistency in trade agreements. Indeed, two notable critical
junctures in the development of labor and environment chapters had a major
173. Bernard Hoekman & Petros Mavroidis, WTO "& la carte" or "menu dujour"? Assessing
the Case for More PlurilateralAgreements, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/wto-a-
la-carte-or-menu-du-jour-assessing-the-case-for-more-purilateral-agreements/.
174. Helfer, supra note 161, at 724.
175. See generally Elizabeth Sanders, Historical Institutionalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 39 (Binder et al. eds., 2008); Rogers Smith, Historical Institutionalism and
the Study of Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW & POLITICS 46 (Keith E. Whittington et al. eds.,
2008).
176. See Katerina Linos, Path Dependence in Discrimination Law: Employment Cases in the
United States and the European Union, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 115, 117 (2010).
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impact on their text. The data confirm that, as historical institutionalism would
predict, design choices can become default choices not because they are better
but because they became entrenched. Inferior agreement designs appear to have
become embedded through TPA's self-reinforcing processes, at least to some
degree, and the current design is consistent with past design. Historical
institutionalists would further conclude that trade agreement language may
become hardwired over time through the institutions that develop it. This
conclusion is also borne out by the data. Paths designed early in the existence of
an institution tend to be followed throughout the institution's development with
an impact on the resulting choices made by institutional actors.17 7
A structural institutionalist account adopts many of these same
assumptions and conclusions. Like historical institutionalism, structural
institutionalism draws from the functionalist literature's approach of seeing a
polity as an overall system of interacting parts.'78 According to one description,
historical institutionalism likewise sees the institutional organization of the
polity as the "principal factor structuring collective behaviour and generating
distinctive outcomes," and emphasizes asymmetries of power in contributing to
path dependence.179 What makes the historical institutionalist theory less
attractive is that, while TPA developed over time, it was not exogenous historical
factors that shaped the consistency in agreements; rather, endogenous structural
developments over time created this lock-in effect. Change in trade agreement
design is not marked out by increasing returns or positive feedback as historical
institutionalism would anticipate. Nor are the operative forces mediated by
context inherited from the past. That is, it was not that antecedent conditions
imposed constraints on the choices that are available now.'80 The choices remain
robust, but the institutional structure that governs the separation of powers
between the branches remains the largest constraint.
Thus, the results of Part I fit poorly with some of the leading theories of
treaty design and change in international law, while the structural institutionalist
account stands apart. Critical junctures in history, a likely status quo bias, and
some learning effects have surely contributed to the level of consistency in U.S.
trade agreements, but the TPA process has limited the range of negotiating
options more than these other factors, particularly due to Congress's outsized
role within that process.
177. See, e.g., Kathleen Thelen, Historical institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 2 ANN. REV.
POL. SCI. 369 (1999).
178. Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms,
44 POL. STUD. 936, 941 (1996). Structural institutionalism as I conceive it draws from neofunctionalist
principles, particularly historical institutionalism, in the way it disassembles States into their constituent
parts to explain institutional dynamics and draws from the same critical assumptions. For more on
neofunctionalism, see Helfer, supra note 161.
179. Hall & Taylor, supra note 178, at 937-41.
180. See Philip M. Nichols, Forgotten Linkages-Historical Institutionalism and Sociological
Institutionalism and Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 461, 478
(1998) (describing how, in historical institutionalism, antecedent conditions impose constraints).
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IV. LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This study has relevance for both scholarship and practice. First, it guides
practitioners to concentrate on seeking to alter the structure of their engagement
before the USTR goes to the negotiating table. Second, it provides an agenda for
scholars to develop further views on trade agreement design.
TPA is now the singular way trade agreements are negotiated and agreed
to by the United States notwithstanding that it is time bound.1"' In effect, TPA
remains both ephemeral and institutionalized. As we move toward the NAFTA
2.0, the Trump Administration plans to complete negotiations under the 2015
TPA framework. Given the results of my analysis, we should expect that the
NAFTA 2.0 will closely resemble the TPP draft and others that came before the
TPP. After the 2015 TPA expires, however, there should be an opportunity for
refocusing, and I suggest that government actors seek to do so. In this Part, I
examine lessons learned from structural institutionalism and additional
implications of the delicate separation of trade law powers on domestic and
international trade law.
A. Lessons
Two features of this structural institutionalism in trade agreements take on
troubling prominence: first, Congress's inability to make changes to its own
negotiating objectives or later acceptance of specific language due to entrenched
opposing views between the parties; and, second, Congress's limited ability to
customize the details of the agreements according to specific trading partners.18 2
From one perspective, and to the extent the current institutional framework
turns Hamilton's vision on its head, the fact that Congress is the lead drafter
should be concerning. It makes Congress an international norm-maker where that
would otherwise be the function of the Executive. First, Congress drafts norms
that form the language of the agreement as a result of the disproportionate role
that Congress plays in the agreement-crafting process. Second, the norms take
on global prominence as the result of a cascade of bilateral and regional
agreements in which other countries have adopted U.S. trade agreement
language. Golove concludes: "Only the most wayward Congress . . . would
contemplate bypassing the President and appointing its own agent to negotiate.
an international agreement."
The fact that the TPA process leads to consistency inconsistently is a
further unsettling element of this arrangement and contrary to TPA's aims. Given
the spectrum of engagement highlighted above, in practice, Congress's
181. Harold Koh refers to TPA as "institutional custom." Koh, supra note 95, at 156.
182. These are in fact not just TPA features but congressional features, though they are most
salient in the TPA context. As Hamilton wrote of treaties: "The greater frequency of the calls upon the
House of Representatives, and the greater length of time which it would often be necessary to keep them
together when convened, to obtain their sanction in the progressive stages of a treaty, would be a source
of so great inconvenience and expense as alone ought o condemn the project." THE FEDERALIST No. 75,
supra note 79, at 420-21.
183. Golove, supra note 93, at 1891.
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delegation is uneven with respect to subject matter and especially so at certain
points in the negotiating process. The delegation becomes particularly
ineffective during the period of negotiation with the foreign partner, post-TPA,
when congressional-executive collaboration should be maximized while
negotiations are underway. In those moments, for certain chapters, our trade
agreements are beholden to the delicate political battle lines that were previously
drawn. On politicized issues such as labor and environment, past, present, and
future generations are limited to fragile political compromises formed at critical
junctures regardless of the particular situation of the trading partner in question.
Interestingly, these topics for which this problem is most salient-the areas of
labor and environment-are areas where the President arguably could act
without Congress under the Constitution.18 4
In sum, under the TPA framework, without the treaty power, the Executive
lost its preeminent agency and agenda-setting authority in the trade negotiating
arena.185 While some important pieces of the trade lawmaking exercise still fall
within the discretion of the Executive, and while the Executive also retains
significant control over the monitoring, enforcement, and withdrawal from an
agreement after it enters into force, the terms of the game (that is, the norms on
which I focus) remain primarily a congressional prerogative. Congress sets the
rules, the agenda, and largely influences the agreement content. The movement
toward a tipped balance began decades ago. The public and congressional
perceptions of executive overreach in this process have led to the "steady
modification" of the TPA process over time in the direction of Congress.186
Absent a reconceptualization in the post-NAFTA 2.0 environment, Congress
will continue to define the four corners of the negotiating space that it affords
the Executive.
B. Restructuring
The above analysis illuminates the trajectory for future trade agreement
negotiations. A review of proposals on the NAFTA 2.0 agenda reveals that,
despite ambitious goals, change has been uneven and many old patterns persist.
While the structural constraints make radical changes unlikely, the coming years
may see greater pressure from the Executive toward an additional critical
juncture. The costs of consistency may finally become too high.
In beginning to think about what a reconceptualization might entail, the
key ought to be bringing the relationship back to balance as intended by the
184. Others have made this argument given that labor and environment could be excepted from
ideas of "foreign commerce" and negotiated as sole executive agreements. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 95,
at 185. The Clinton Administration applied this principle in its conclusion of the side agreements to the
NAFTA.
185. For more on the power of the treaty to the Executive, see Jost E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS As LAW-MAKERS 396 (2005) ("[T]reaty-making may enhance the power of executive
branches within governments, at the expense of national parliaments or legislatures, and sometimes
permits the executive branch to accomplish legal changes that it alone could not accomplish or, in those
states that accord treaties superior status to a national constitution, even to take legal actions otherwise
not authorized to any branch of government.").
186. Koh, supra note 95, at 171.
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Founders. Koh has claimed that, for an "institutional marriage" between the
branches of government to function effectively, a "zone of discretion," with
broad signposts, is required.187 Indeed, in 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court
concluded that so long as the Executive acts consistently with the "general tenor"
of the legislative framework, Congress has license to create permissible space
for executive action.'88 Congress and the Executive should seek to develop a
pragmatic mechanism to replace fast track. That mechanism should include
formalized procedures to govern lawmaking interactions that nevertheless permit
innovation.
Under a revised process, congressional objectives could be just that:
objectives or guidelines, not the four comers of the negotiating space. Unlike the
United States, the EU prepares and receives negotiating directives that are
specific to each agreement. Such a process may go a long way to discontinuing
the current path dependence in chapters that would benefit from
customization.189
As a general matter, having the Executive work from guiding principles in
consultation with the legislative branch makes good sense for the democratic
accountability that engagement provides.190 A reconceptualization would also
help avoid a situation in which the Executive seeks to take on trade agreements
as sole executive agreements removing any role for Congress.1 9 1 To be sure, a
re-design in the direction of the Executive does not mean a return to the treaty
power, nor does it mean a move to putting sensitive subjects of the key chapters
in side agreements negotiated under the Executive's prerogative. It was an
important development for labor and environment to be incorporated into the
agreement, including making those obligations subject to dispute settlement. A
side agreement would defeat those important gains and principles. The treaty
power with its uncertainties and higher requirement for passage does not appear
to provide a reasonable alternative without more.192
187. Harold Hongiu Koh, Triptych's End: A Better Framework to Evaluate 21st Century
International Lawmaking, 126 YALEL.J.F. 337, 345 (2017).
188. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-79 (1981).
189. Hal Shapiro and Lael Brainard adroitly put it this way: "A more effective fast track would
require meaningful congressional input into negotiations, more selective application of fast track by the
president, and closer targeting of fast track provisions to particular agreements." Shapiro & Brainard,
supra note 1818, at 43. Neither I nor they were the first to make suggested changes to TPA. See Koh,
supra note 95; Sim, supra note 94.
190. For one commentary noting the democratic values of fast track, see Oona A. Hathaway,
Treaties'End: The Past, Present, and Future ofInternational Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE.
L.J. 1236, 1308-12 (2008) (arguing that congressional-executive agreements approved by majorities of
both houses have greater democratic legitimacy than treaties approved by two-thirds of the Senate). For a
contrasting view, see 140 CONG. REC. S15104 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1994) (Sen. Byrd lamenting "the rape
of the legislative process by the fast-track procedures" as destructive to sovereignty); Robert E. Hudec,
"Circumventing" Democracy: The Political Morality ofTrade Negotiations, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
311 (1993).
191. Representative Sander Levin spoke to this also in his consideration of Congress's role:
"There should be something between nitpicking and no role at all for Congress." David S. Cloud,
Lawmakers Offer Plans To Modify Fast Track, 49 CONG. Q. 1047 (1991).
192. Durkee discusses how others have made this point about treaties in areas outside of trade.
See Durkee, supra note 133, at 267 (summarizing criticism on the limits of the treaty). Innovative
mechanisms of treaty design could make the treaty approach more palatable, though such an exploration
exceeds the scope of this project.
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When it comes to the congressional-executive r lationship in trade, a better
use of the checks and balances in the structural separation of powers should be
applied to transparency and information sharing. Procedural accommodations
are needed for the new generation of trade practice. The post-2015 TPA
environment is ripe for reevaluation and further consideration of what an
improved future process might entail.
CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed how the similarities among recent and
anticipated trade agreements and the lack of innovative space are the result of
structural dynamics in the U.S. trade lawmaking apparatus. The additional
intermediate scrutiny of larger agreements passed under TPA as it has evolved
has led to significant paralysis in certain chapters that may be counter-productive
to U.S. interests. Today, TPA exacerbates rather than ameliorates the
politicization of trade agreements. The prospects for improvements and creative
additions to trade agreements in the future is significantly tempered by this path
dependence.
Fundamentally, the question about how much congressional participation
or executive delegation is accommodated in our trade lawmaking is a question
about ensuring public accountability for negative externalities. It is this
sentiment that results in the strongest public reaction to such agreements. Thus,
despite President Obama's high approval ratings in his last six months in office,
the public response to the TPP was overwhelmingly negative, exacerbated by
political rhetoric in the presidential campaigns that used the TPP as a proxy for
limited economic growth.
That TPA may create a de facto principal-agent relationship between the
branches is an important heuristic. At a time of significant political upheaval,
and at a moment of opportunity for reevaluating the separation of trade law
powers between the branches, the implications for this unbalanced relationship
are wide-reaching and require urgent attention for the benefit of the U.S. and
global economies.
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